War Exposes Cracks in US-Israel Alliance

Alliances fight wars effectively only when they share an endgame.
If Israel acted without US knowledge, then the military alliance is operating without real coordination at the level of strategic targeting.
Neither picture is reassuring in a war that is no longer regional in its consequences.
Prem Panicker continues his must read daily blog on the Gulf War.

The most revealing moment of the last 24 hours did not come from the battlefield. [CBS News Live Updates (external link)]

Donald Trump told reporters that the United States had no advance knowledge of Israel's strike on South Pars.

He was contradicted almost immediately by Israeli officials and even by members of his own administration.

At a time when there is no dearth of incident, the episode was quickly dismissed as Trump doing Trump things and swept away by the firehose of 'breaking news'.

US-Israel Rift Emerges

For me, though, the denial itself is the story.

Because in the middle of a war that has already destabilised global energy markets, reshuffled the geopolitics of the Gulf, and put food security and the global economy at risk, the two allies prosecuting the war just offered a public glimpse of a partnership that is not, in fact, aligned. [Reuters (external link); AP (external link); Live Science (external link)]

Alliances fight wars effectively only when they share an endgame.

When one partner is thinking about deterrence and the other is thinking about obliteration, the gap between them does not stay hidden.

It surfaces in unilateral strikes, in public contradictions and ideological confusion.

South Pars is the engine of Iran's economy, part of the largest gas field in the world.

To strike it is to signal that the war has moved from coercion to something closer to elimination, and that is a significant strategic shift with consequences that will ramify all across the world.

The question of whether one ally took that step without the other's knowledge, or whether one ally is now pretending it did for domestic reasons, matters enormously.

South Pars Strike Escalation

If Israel acted without US knowledge, then the military alliance is operating without real coordination at the level of strategic targeting.

If the Trump administration knew and is now acting out surprise for a domestic audience, then the alliance is coordinated but dishonest.

It is willing to publicly undermine shared strategy when the domestic optics require it.

Neither picture is reassuring in a war that is no longer regional in its consequences.

• WAR IN THE GULF (external link)

The fog is partly manufactured

There is a wider point here that goes beyond the specific episode.

Wars generate confusion as a matter of course.

Clausewitz's fog is partly inherent: The friction of operations, the unreliability of intelligence, the speed of events outrunning analysis.

But some of the fog in this war is being produced deliberately, by actors who benefit from ambiguity.

An ally that strikes without warning and then watches its partner's denial play out in real time is not confused.

It is conducting misinformation operations on its own coalition.

Energy Infrastructure Now Targets

That is a dangerous dynamic when the stakes are global.

The attacks on South Pars, and on LNG infrastructure across the Gulf, have already done something structural: they have collapsed the longstanding assumption that energy facilities are off-limits in regional wars.

Once that rule breaks, it breaks for everyone.

Flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which account for nearly a fifth of the world's oil, are no longer a theoretical vulnerability.

For countries like India, with roughly half their crude imports moving through Hormuz-adjacent routes, the alliance's internal confusion is not an abstraction.

It means that the decisions being made about what to hit next -- decisions, note, that move Brent prices, rupee exchange rates, and domestic inflation in real time -- are being made without a coherent shared strategy.

The Iran war is no longer about regional hegemony.

It is about control over the physical and financial arteries of global energy.

In the past 24 hours, the pattern has hardened: Repeated strikes on Ras Laffan LNG hubs, South Pars‑linked gas fields, and refineries such as Haifa mean that the battlefield is being fought in the world's fuel pump.

For India and other energy‑importing middle powers, this reframing is sobering: It exposes how a distant conflict can recalibrate inflation, exchange‑rate stability and the basic terms of economic life without a single foreign soldier landing on home soil.

For India, this is a direct macro‑economic shock.

The country's CPI inflation accelerated to 3.21 per cent year-on-year in February, up from 2.74 per cent in January, with further pressure expected from higher LPG and fuel prices in March.

At the same time, the rupee has weakened to around 93.1-93.2 per USD, representing roughly an 8 per cent depreciation over the past year and a 2.7 per cent decline over the last month alone.

Against this backdrop, Brent crude is trading near 104-106 USD per barrel, after briefly surging above 110 USD in early March amid attacks on Iranian export hubs and fears of Strait-of-Hormuz disruption.

India Faces Oil Shock Impact

This combination of elevated Brent prices, rising domestic inflation, and a weaker rupee compresses both households' real incomes and the government's fiscal and monetary space.

India's wholesale price index (WPI) inflation also reflects this pressure: it stood at 2.13 per cent in February, signaling that the cost-push from higher global input prices is feeding through into the manufacturing and producer-level chain.

For a government that has publicly resisted a full-scale interest-rate cut to avoid exacerbating capital-outflow and inflation pressures, the Iran-driven oil shock is closing the window for growth-oriented policy.

[For reporting on the widening infrastructure strikes, read The Washington Post (external link) (paywalled)]

India's Posture: Between Silence And Alignment

India's public response to the latest round of Gulf-energy strikes crystallizes its central dilemma: deeply exposed to the energy shock but politically committed to visible restraint.

The foreign ministry statement that Iran's attacks on infrastructure in Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are 'deeply disturbing' and 'unacceptable' marks a quiet but real hardening of tone, moving beyond generic calls for de-escalation toward explicit condemnation of strikes on critical civilian-linked assets.

However, this is paired with a 'strategic silence' on the war's origins and a refusal to openly apportion blame to the US and Israel for starting a war that has ruinous consequences.

This posture looks less like genuine neutrality and more like a calibrated alignment with the US-Israel-Arab-monarchy coalition.

By joining UNSC-level condemnations of Iran's Gulf-energy strikes, India is effectively siding with the bloc that started the war and treating Iran's retaliatory offensives as unlawful aggression.

At the same time, voices both at home and abroad seek to position India as the sole big power capable of playing mediator.

This might play into the 'Vishwaguru' image the ruling dispensation has sought to embed in the national consciousness, but it is unworkable in practice: If, for instance, India sides with one party to the conflict while condemning the actions of the other party, why should the second party, to wit, Iran, be willing to accept India as a neutral mediator?

DUELLING VOICES: India's silence -- statecraft or abdication?

The sharpest domestic debate provoked by the Iran war is not about energy prices or diaspora safety.

It is about whether India still has a moral voice in the world -- and whether it should use it.

<>Writing in The Indian Express, Congress MP Shashi Tharoor defends the government's silence as responsible statecraft, invoking the precedent of India's reluctance to condemn Soviet interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.

The argument is familiar: Principles must be weighed against interests, loud lecturing does not combine well with low leverage, and silence in the absence of leverage can itself be a strategy.

It is a case made with characteristic elegance. It is also, at its core, an argument that morality is fungible; that what is wrong can be set aside when the costs of saying so are high enough. [Shashi Tharoor, Indian Express (external link)]

RJD MP Manoj Kumar Jha, also writing in the Express, pushes back directly.

His counter is historical rather than abstract: From the Suez Crisis to Apartheid to Bangladesh, India built its moral capital precisely by speaking when silence would have been safer.

The Suez condemnation cost India real friction with Britain.

The Apartheid stance put it at odds with the Western economic consensus for decades.

The 1971 intervention came despite explicit American and Chinese disapproval.

In each case, India chose articulation over accommodation, and its credibility in the world was enhanced as a result.

Jha's challenge to Tharoor is quietly devastating: If the scale now consistently tilts toward silence, he asks, has the scale itself been recalibrated? [Manoj K Jha, Indian Express (external link)]

The honest answer, looking at India's posture over the past fortnight, is yes.

This tension is analytically useful because it exposes how democracies bargain ethics and interest in distant wars.

India's posture is not unique in that sense.

Many middle powers oscillate between moral posturing and pragmatic accommodation, but the stakes here are unusually high because the conflict is directly shaping the cost and availability of energy for a large, still-developing population.

Additional Reading:

The Financial Times has the essential backstory to the war: a multi-byline reconstruction of how Benjamin Netanyahu spent four decades working to anchor the United States in a confrontation with Iran, and how Donald Trump became the president who finally said yes.

The piece traces the relationship from Netanyahu's 1992 parliamentary speech predicting an Iranian bomb by 1999 through the Mar-a-Lago lunch in December where the two men agreed on a tentative date for war, even as negotiations with Tehran were nominally underway.

The most damning detail: Military preparations were being stepped up while diplomats were still at the table in Oman and Geneva.

Iran, it turns out, was right to call the talks a smokescreen.

Essential context for understanding why the alliance's current incoherence, visible in the South Pars denial, was baked in from the start. [Multiple authors, Financial Times (external link)]

The most extraordinary piece in today's reading list, and possibly in the war's coverage so far, is by Oman's foreign minister, who was himself the mediator in the most recent US-Iran nuclear talks.

Badr Albusaidi writes with barely concealed fury that America has lost control of its own foreign policy, that the war is unlawful, and that Iran's retaliation was 'probably the only rational option available'.

The diagnosis is surgical: Two parties, Iran and America have nothing to gain from this war; Israel has its own objectives, which are not America's.

The off-ramp Albusaidi proposes is serious: Linking bilateral negotiations to a wider regional nuclear transparency framework.

But the more important service this piece performs is simply telling the truth from inside the room.

Read alongside the FT reconstruction of how Netanyahu anchored Trump into this war, it completes the picture. [Badr Albusaidi, The Economist (external link)]

Also read this piece in The Guardian, quoting Britain's national security advisor Jonathan Powell saying that he believed the deal Iran proposed during the negotiations was very good, and opened the door to a negotiated settlement. [The Guardian (external link)].

Read together, the FT piece, the Economist article, and the Guardian piece are unequivocal that this war isn't a failure of diplomacy but a deliberate subversion of it.

The sharpest operational analysis of where the war stands comes from Trita Parsi.

Parsi's core argument: The US had a Plan A -- decapitate the leadership, trigger collapse -- and no Plan B.

The result is that Israel is now driving the bus, pursuing its own objective of degrading Iran's entire industrial base regardless of the consequences for energy markets or even Trump's presidency.

The most important signal in the last 24 hours, Parsi argues, is not the strikes but US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's hint at sanctions relief -- an acknowledgement that escalation options are becoming suicidal.

The off-ramp exists. Whether the timing works for both sides before Trump's window to declare victory closes is the central uncertainty. [Trita Parsi on X (external link)]

University of Chicago political scientist Robert A Pape draws a threshold distinction that reframes everything: The difference between disruption and damage.

Disruption, which is shipping delays, insurance spikes, tanker rerouting, is reversible.

Damage to physical infrastructure -- export terminals, refineries, offshore platforms -- is not.

Pape's argument is that we are approaching the crossing of that threshold, and once crossed, the logic of the war changes permanently.

The Boer War and the 1991 Kuwait oil fires are his historical anchors.

If Iran strikes at the level of damage rather than disruption, a regional war becomes a global economic crisis. Worth reading slowly. [Robert A Pape, Substack (external link)]

The clearest factual account of what the Ras Laffan strike actually means in energy terms comes from Raja Abdulrahim.

Qatar's energy minister puts the damage at 17 percent of LNG export capacity and $20 billion in lost annual revenues, with repair estimates of three to five years.

Ras Laffan accounts for roughly a fifth of global LNG supply.

Europe saw gas prices surge 30 percent in a single day.

The piece is essential context for understanding why the shift from disruption to damage (which is Robert Pape's threshold) is not theoretical.

It is already, in part, underway. [Raja Abdulrahim, The New York Times (external link)]

Franklin Foer argues that Trump raised the hopes of Iran's pro-democracy protesters -- 'help is on the way' -- and then discarded them the moment it became clear the regime would not quickly collapse.

The piece traces a bipartisan American failure to meaningfully support Iranian civil society, from Obama's studied distance during the 2009 Green Revolution to Trump's dismantling of Voice of America and the National Endowment for Democracy.

The conclusion is uncomfortable: If regime change is the only durable solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, American foreign policy has spent decades undermining the only people willing to pursue it. [Franklin Foer, The Atlantic (external link)]

• MUST READS: The New Fog of War
• Has US Repeated Its Iraq Mistake?
• Hormuz Crisis Threatens Global Economy
• Iran War Exposes Washington's Strategic Chaos
• Iran Plays Hardball With India's Hormuz Requests
• Trump Is Caught Between Two Bad Options
• Iran Rewrites Rules of War
• Why Did Israel Kill Ali Larijani?
• Trump's War Has Crossed Energy Rubicon. And There's No Turning Back

Photographs curated by Manisha Kotian/Rediff
Feature Presentation: Ashish Narsale/Rediff