'India won't take anything from Pakistan lying down.'
India's cross-border missile strikes on multiple terror hubs in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and in Pakistan marks a significant escalation in India's response to cross-border terrorism.
In this incisive interview with Rediff's Prasanna D Zore, Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, argues that India's message -- that terrorism will now invite steep costs -- is finally being delivered with clarity.
How do you assess India's choice of precision missile strikes in Operation Sindoor? Was it a calibrated escalation and a necessary message after Pahalgam?
The message should have been taken by Pakistan in 2016 with the (Uri) surgical strikes, and should have sunk home in 2019 with the Balakot attacks. But it didn't filter down to the Pakistani mind that this terrorism game was over, that India's patience has ended.
For their domestic political reasons and given the Pakistani army's mindset, they always return to their default position -- attempting terror attacks, highlighting Kashmir internationally, and increasing tension with India so the army can buttress its position. It's an old template.
They should have realised that trying something now would bring consequences worse than 2019. They thought India would show outrage but ultimately do nothing.
From India's side, they needed to deliver a stronger message than Balakot, so they attacked multiple terror headquarters simultaneously. The Indian statement made clear this wasn't about starting a conflict but sending a strong message that Pakistan's use of these (terrorist) groups against India is unacceptable, with costs attached.
Beyond a point, we don't care about the consequences.
It was necessary and showed Indian resoluteness that this terrorism game must end. It's 40 years old -- way past its sell-by date. Pakistanis need to understand this.
What was the piece India missed in the surgical strikes and Balakot air strike that Operation Sindoor might fill in dealing definitively with cross-border terrorism?
India has steadily climbed the response ladder. Uri was a shallow strike. Balakot was 80 kilometres inside Pakistan using air power, which is considered escalatory.
What we missed at Balakot was that Pakistan responded, and we didn't go further up the escalation ladder. We didn't respond to their response. It became a tit-for-tat that provided an off-ramp for both sides.
India's message was 'don't try this again,' but Pakistan thought they could square accounts by hitting back.
By not escalating last time, we gave Pakistan one last chance, allowing them to think they could equalise by retaliating. They mistook it as India's weakness.
This time, after our operation, Pakistan tried to square accounts (on the intervening night of May 7 and 8) while staying below the threshold -- not targeting major installations but military sites, radar and air defence systems.
Their attack was foiled, and India decided not to leave it unanswered. With minimal damage done, India's response was proportionate but more effective, causing damage on Pakistan's side.
Now the ball is in Pakistan's court on further escalation. The message from the night of the 7th-8th is that we (India) don't want escalation, but we'll hit back if provoked.
If they cause serious damage, our response won't be proportionate -- everything will be in the crosshairs.
Do you think Operation Sindoor will alter Pakistan's cost-benefit calculus regarding cross-border terrorism?
It depends on how obtuse the Pakistani mind is. If they were rational, they'd understand the terrorism game has run its course. India is willing to turn its back on Pakistan, pretend it doesn't exist, and not engage. We'll do our own thing, you do yours -- just don't mess with us.
Pakistan seems unable to move past this fixation. If they calculated that terrorism hurts them too and that continuous conflict with India is an expensive proposition serving no purpose, they might stop.
What strategic aim does this serve? They provoke India, but India no longer tolerates it -- India hits back.
If they recognise this reality, perhaps their behaviour changes. If not -- if they think 'the Indians did what they wanted, we'll bide our time and strike when they don't expect it' -- we'll spiral into another cycle again.
Given Pakistan's internal challenges in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, how do you think the army headquarters in Rawalpindi will respond politically and militarily to India's escalation?
That's the million dollar question. Do they want to escalate further? Can they afford conflict with their weak economy and an already hot second front? They have serious commitments and no political unity internally. They are not in a happy situation.
For regime survival, not responding creates enormous political pressure and questions their raison d'etre. But escalating puts them in very risky territory. A major setback would devastate their economy, as war is extremely expensive.
India would suffer too, of course, but Pakistan's capacity to absorb that wound is seriously suspect. Their calculation comes down to: What matters more -- Pakistan's survival or the regime's survival? That's the choice.
Would India's military and intelligence establishment give even a 10% chance of Balochistan seceding from Pakistan, similar to 1971?
I don't give it even a 10% chance. It could happen if conflict weakens the Pakistani State to where it can't address internal problems. Then the Balochistan question erupts openly, as does the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) question.
If Pakistan manages to back off, the Baloch can't easily secede now. Their opportunity comes only if they grow strong enough to challenge the Pakistani State -- which is currently difficult -- or if Pakistan weakens to where they can break away. I see no third possibility.
What role might Beijing play? Will they restrain Pakistan or encourage brinkmanship?
There are two perspectives. One is that China wouldn't want major conflict because their investments would be lost, and openly helping Pakistan would seriously damage their India relationship.
The other view is that China might use Pakistan as a cat's paw to hurt India and derail planned investments by creating a conflict situation. They'd kill two birds with one stone.
I don't know their exact intentions, but their statement after Operation Sindoor called the situation 'distressing' or 'disturbing,' while suggesting both sides avoid escalation -- which we can live with.
The question is whether Pakistan will heed this. Indian planners must have surely considered this factor before launching Operation Sindoor. As someone in the current hierarchy reportedly said -- if you account for everything, you can never act.
Sometimes you just say, 'We'll see when we cross that bridge.'
There's speculation that targets in Operation Sindoor were linked to Pakistan's army, not just terror camps. If true, what message was India sending?
All terrorists are linked to Pakistan's army. They aren't independent or non-State actors -- they are State actors under different labels. They can't operate without Pakistani State complicity and concurrence.
If we wanted to hit the Pakistan army directly, we would have. There was a conscious decision to attack only terror camps, headquarters, and bases -- not military targets. That was on the (intervening night of May) 6th and 7th.
What happened on the (intervening night of May) 7th and 8th was different -- they hit military targets, so we targeted military targets in response. We need to make that distinction.
What should India's strategic planners focus on now? Sustained military pressure, covert operations, or deterrent stability?
A bit of all three: There will be sustained military pressure as we continue building our military capabilities -- that's a no-brainer. We'll maintain pressure on Pakistan. All three elements will come into play.
But India isn't gunning for war -- far from it. However, India won't take anything from Pakistan lying down. That's the message in a nutshell.
I don't claim to speak for anyone else. I'm not privy to government decisions. This is simply my interpretation.
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