'India enjoys conventional superiority, but nuclear deterrence imposes clear boundaries.'
As India-Pakistan tensions escalate to dangerous levels, the crisis is unfolding within a far more complex and volatile geopolitical environment than in previous decades.
In the concluding part of his interview with Rediff's Utkarsh Mishra, Dr Walter C Ladwig III, associate professor of international relations at King's College London, says that while the United States remains aligned with India, its diminished diplomatic capacity in South Asia has raised questions about its ability to meaningfully influence events.
China, on the other hand, continues to deepen ties with Islamabad, even as its own interests are threatened by instability in the region.
Another recent development in the region is the deterioration of ties between Bangladesh and India. Some provocative statements have emerged from Dhaka, even suggesting Chinese involvement in India's northeast. Does this limit India's strategic room for manoeuvre on its western front?
Tensions with Bangladesh introduce friction, but they are unlikely to constrain India's western posture in a meaningful way.
The military balance in the east remains comfortably in India's favour. However, inflammatory rhetoric from Dhaka -- especially if amplified by Chinese messaging -- creates a risk of distraction or grey-zone pressure in the northeast.
This does not limit India's capacity, but it does require political attention and intelligence resources that might otherwise be focused westward.
The bigger constraint on India is the need to maintain sufficient forces on the Chinese frontier.
In the context of ongoing US-China rivalry -- with Washington more aligned with India and Beijing with Pakistan -- what roles do you see these powers playing in the current crisis?
This crisis unfolds at a time when both the United States and China are strategically invested in South Asia -- but neither is well-positioned to shape its trajectory meaningfully.
Washington remains diplomatically aligned with India, and will likely continue to shield New Delhi from multilateral censure to a degree.
Yet unlike in 2019, when the US quietly backed India's right to retaliate, the current administration has issued standard calls for restraint from both sides.
This reflects concern over escalation, yes -- but also a deeper problem: The US lacks both the personnel and policy bandwidth to exert meaningful influence in the region.
At present, there is no confirmed American ambassador in either Delhi or Islamabad. Senior South Asia posts at the State Department remain unfilled. The regional bureau is depleted.
And years of institutional expertise -- particularly in South Asia strategy -- have been hollowed out by funding cuts, disillusionment, and attrition.
To make matters worse, what remains of this expertise is being gutted by Elon Musk's ludicrous DOGE program -- a vanity project masquerading as a digital innovation agenda, but in practice an exercise in institutional vandalism undertaken by someone who doesn't even understand how the US government works.
The loss of career diplomats and regional experts to shrink the size of the government has come at the expense of real-world crisis management.
It is hard to overstate the absurdity of it: At a moment of real geopolitical danger, South Asia desks are being cleared to accommodate an erratic billionaire's ignorant fixation.
In short, while Washington may have opinions, it presently lacks a coherent interagency response team for South Asia.
China, for all its strategic flaws, at least has a working foreign policy bureaucracy.
While Pakistan has faced terrorism targeting Chinese interests, many observers don't distinguish this from anti-India terrorism. But isn't there a fundamental difference -- especially since Pakistan has a strong incentive to curb anti-China militancy, but arguably less so in the case of anti-India groups? Do you agree?
Absolutely -- and it's both strategic and operational.
Attacks on Chinese personnel and infrastructure in Pakistan represent a direct threat to core economic and diplomatic interests.
China is not only Pakistan's largest strategic investor but a guarantor of essential economic lifelines through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
As such, Pakistan has a strong incentive to act swiftly against anti-China militancy, often deploying elite units, conducting kinetic raids, and establishing dedicated security corridors.
In contrast, anti-India terrorist groups have historically operated in a more permissive environment.
Despite rhetorical shifts in Islamabad and some pressure on groups by previous army chiefs, under General Munir the underlying calculus is back to the bad old days: Groups targeting India are still seen, in some quarters, as retaining strategic utility, particularly with regard to Kashmir.
Even when proscribed, enforcement against these networks has remained inconsistent-- reflecting both political ambiguity and selective prioritisation.
That said, it is important not to overstate Pakistan's ability to suppress anti-China violence either.
Attacks on Chinese nationals and assets continue to occur -- not because of political indulgence, but because of limitations in the reach, training, and coordination of Pakistani security forces.
Militants in Balochistan and elsewhere have proven adept at exploiting gaps in the state's counterinsurgency posture.
So while the intent to protect Chinese interests exists at the highest levels, the capacity to do so consistently remains uneven.
In short, the distinction between how Pakistan treats anti-China versus anti-India terrorism is real -- but it is shaped not only by political will, but by the limits of State capacity. Where Islamabad cannot -- or chooses not to -- act decisively, the result is persistent instability and asymmetric risk for its neighbours and partners alike.
If this crisis were to escalate into a full-scale war, what would that entail for both India and Pakistan? Could we witness a repeat of 1971 -- that is, the possibility of Pakistan breaking apart again?
Full-scale war would be catastrophic.
India enjoys conventional superiority, but nuclear deterrence imposes clear boundaries.
While Pakistan faces serious internal strains -- economic, political, and social -- a replay of 1971 is improbable.
Unlike East Pakistan in 1971, there is no secessionist movement with the same degree of international isolation or geographic separation.
A war might unify Pakistan in the short term. That said, prolonged conflict or decisive military defeat could deepen regional fragmentation over time.
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