'Bangladesh Remains Quiet On China's Influence'

'The BNP's election manifesto lists grievances against India, mirroring the attitude of past BNP governments.'
'Political parties have been careful not to say bad things about China.'

As Bangladesh goes to the polls on February 12, eighteen months after the ouster of then prime minister Sheikh Hasina and subsequent worsening of India-Bangladesh ties, the question is whether the new government in Dhaka can usher a reset -- and address India's concerns about the expanding Chinese-Pakistani footprint in Bangladesh?

"India will shape Bangladesh's trajectory in more ways than China can because of geography. India respects Bangladesh as a regional power. Let's not inject China or Pakistan into the discussion, but treat ties to India on their own merits," says Ambassador Jitendra Nath Misra, India's former envoy to Portugal and currently Professor of Diplomatic Practice at O. P Jindal Global University, who also served in the Indian high commission in Dhaka.

"India needs to deal with Bangladesh on terms both India and Bangladesh can live with. Bangladesh is India's only large neighbour with settled land borders. Dial down the noise, and ties will recover," Ambassador Misra tells Rediff's Archana Masih.

What are the reasons for the increase in violence against Hindus and minorities in Bangladesh? Is it to further vitiate the atmosphere before the elections? Provoke internal turmoil in India?

Violence against Hindus is built into the sense of victimhood of Bangladeshi Muslims. In Bangladesh the reading of Bengal's history is coloured by perceived Muslim grievances against upper caste Hindu landlords. It doesn't matter which party is in power. There are recorded cases of lower-level Awami League officials perpetrating violence against Hindus.

Violence also is about seizure of Hindu properties. The census data is stark. In 1951 Hindus were 22% of the population, in 2022, they were down to 8%. The decline is precipitous.

More of the same is likely happening now. The Indian government says according to independent estimates there were more than 2,900 incidents of violence against minorities during the term of the interim government.

It is not just lawlessness, it might be a calculated Islamist surge to influence the outcome of the elections.

Jamaat has fielded a Hindu candidate. It claims to have changed. The Indian media was willing to downplay atrocities against Hindus during the Awami League's rule because politics in Bangladesh was seen as the secular Awami League versus others.

Reality is more complex. Today the Indian media is more vocal, angering Indians against Bangladesh. In a democracy the government is answerable to public sentiment, it must respond to Bangladesh in some way.

We will have elections soon in West Bengal and Assam. No country can separate foreign relations from domestic politics. You are right that violence against Hindus in Bangladesh causes internal turmoil in India.

How best should India deal with this mounting concern?

India must continue to engage those in power, and those out of power, now, and after the elections. Surely India diversified its networks during the Awami League's rule, or maybe not enough. Future historians will know after the archives are made public.

I can tell you from direct experience of working in Dhaka that India talks to all recognised parties, including those unfriendly towards India. A senior Jamaat leader has told the BBC's Soutik Biswas that Indian officials had engaged with Jamaat four times the last year, and the Indian high commission in Dhaka invited Jamaat to the Republic Day reception.

It might work, or not. India's choices are bad, or worse.

What repercussions does this have for India, especially in the border states?

It has negative repercussions. This is unfortunate, shared prosperity is better than mutual acrimony. But here's another story. Bangladesh is crucial for India's internal cohesion, allowing transit of Indian goods to the bordering states and beyond in the north east.

I have not read about opposition in Bangladesh to previous transit agreements, and it's not an issue in the elections. The two sides established six land ports, revived six railway lines from the past, and established a Friendship Pipeline to supply diesel.

In 2025 both Bangladesh's interim government and India supported trilateral connectivity allowing two-way transit of Bhutanese goods through India. For Bangladesh transit is a pragmatic choice, a far cry from the 1990s when denial of transit was a diplomatic weapon.

Dense transit channels helped Bangladesh become India's largest trading partner in South Asia, and a top-five trading partner. So, both sides would be pleased that transit remains.

How does China's expanding footprint in Bangladesh imperil India's strategic interests? To what extent will China's influence in Bangladesh challenge India's security in the Siliguri corridor?

China's message to India's neighbours is simple: India can't look after itself, how can it look after you? So, you must accommodate China.

China is India's greatest security challenge, it coerces even while it seeks to seduce. China has reached some accommodation with India without conceding on core interests. Will China cede space to India in Bangladesh just because of the adjustment of ties to India? I doubt it.

There are reports of India strengthening fortifications in the Siliguri Corridor and building an underground communication link to the north east. There are suggestions that India should offer Bangladesh a money-for-land swap involving purchase of Bangladeshi territory south of the Siliguri Corridor.

In January Bangladesh and China concluded a defence agreement for a drone factory. For China it makes sense to put pressure on India from the north of the Siliguri Corridor and seek Bangladesh's nod to put pressure from the south. Bangladesh may not agree, at least beyond a point.

Could Bangladesh's deepening economic and military dependence on China limit India's foreign and trade policy choices?

Yes, because these choices are not just for India to make. Bangladesh is also a party, and what Bangladesh does with China will affect India-Bangladesh ties. For sure it's not a zero-sum game, but it nevertheless is a triangular relationship.

Sheikh Hasina was careful to avoid strategic alignment with China against India. And now? I'm not sure the new government can reverse dependence on China, even if it wanted to.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute since 2010 Bangladesh has procured $2.59 billion worth of military equipment from China.

Bangladesh is reportedly in talks with Pakistan to procure the J-17 fighter jet. There are even reports of possible purchases of the Chinese J10-CE fighter aircraft which Pakistan had deployed during Operation Sindoor.

Remember, the J-17 has been jointly developed by China and Pakistan. Contrast the privileged access accorded China with the wariness towards India.

The Awami League, according to Bangladeshi friends who don't want to be named, did not implement the 2019 agreement to set up a coastal surveillance system radar in Bangladesh. Developing military ties to India faces political resistance across party lines.

And trade? In 2019 Bangladesh had a trade deficit of $ 12 billion with China. Yes, denser ties with China undermine ties to India. As I said, for India Bangladesh is a vital economic partner.

Bangladeshi tourist arrivals in India during the first four months of 2024 were 20 per cent of total arrivals. In 2023-2024, India's exports to Bangladesh were worth $ 11.1 billion. The Adani group has been supplying almost 1,500 megawatts of power to Bangladesh. Will dependence on China result in Bangladesh scaling down economic ties to India? Who knows?

Why I'm not sure is because economic and military dependence on China could increase under the new government. The China of today is different from the China of the past. China gives high attention to Bangladesh because its thinking about the role of the Bay of Bengal has changed. Even the Awami League gave China privileged access.

Bangladesh remains resolutely quiet on China's influence. The BNP's election manifesto lists grievances against India, mirroring the attitude of past BNP governments. Political parties have been careful not to say bad things about China.

I am not aware of even scholars and think tankers in Bangladesh speaking about the negative effects of China's damming of the Brahmaputra. Grievances on water sharing are all about India.

How can India effectively counter China and Pakistan's growing influence in Bangladesh?

India needs to bolster economic links and durable structures that withstand political storms. I think both countries recognise the importance of shared prosperity. Otherwise, as I said, the interim government would have overturned transit agreements and put brakes on connectivity.

Maybe Bangladesh has overcome its historical aversion to economic integration with India. Bangladesh didn't become a regional power just because of China's infrastructure projects.

India will shape Bangladesh's trajectory in more ways than China can because of geography. India respects Bangladesh as a regional power. Let's not inject China or Pakistan into the discussion, but treat ties to India on their own merits.

India must sustain an uninterrupted political conversation with all, including the Opposition parties, and conduct quiet diplomacy to prevent disagreements from becoming structural differences. India must strengthen people-to-people links and economic ties.

There are positive pointers. In the worst of times trade has remained stable. According to AFP only one bilateral agreement from the Hasina era, for Indian tugboats, was scrapped.

India needs to deal with Bangladesh on terms both India and Bangladesh can live with. India must also seek to convince the US that our interests in Bangladesh are congruent-neither deepening ties to China nor Islamism serve US interests.

I am not pessimistic. Bangladesh is India's only large neighbour with settled land borders. Dial down the noise, and ties will recover.

Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff