'If there is a military standoff eyeball to eyeball on the western border, the Chinese could create problems by making movements in the north, in our northeast, which could involve us tying down some forces there so that could stretch our military actions.'
The government directive to conduct national drills on Wednesday, May 7, may be part of the psywars currently being conducted by India and Pakistan, but it has spooked many Indians, one of who whatsapped this correspondent late on Monday evening to ask: "Will there be war?"
The government firman also revived memories of the hours before Indira Gandhi announced that India and Pakistan were at war on December 3, 1971 when one's parents hurriedly pasted dark brown paper over all the windows at our modest Bombay flat so that no light could peek outside and enable enemy aircraft to track its targets.
We also switched from tubelights to dull yellow bulbs during that 13-day war to mute any light visible from the air. In the event, no Pakistani aircraft breached the airspace over Bombay.
What route will Pakistani retaliation take should India undertake military action to punish the masterminds behind the horrific 22/4 terror attack in Pahalgam?
Pakistan's military establishment at GHQ Rawalpindi -- including its by-some-accounts intellectually challenged army chief -- have threatened reprisals should New Delhi initiate surgical or air strikes. Bluff or intent? we asked Rana Banerji, who made it his business to study the Pakistan army and government during his 28 years at the Research and Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency, and after retirement from RA&W.
"The longer it (India's retaliation) takes, the suspense may wear off or there would be automatic de-escalation. So some action, if it has to be done, will have to be taken soon enough," explains Mr Banerji in the second part of a multi-part interview.
Sir, what can India do to punish the Pakistan military without actually going to war?
That is very difficult to say. I mean, there are various options, but military minds have to decide on that. But again, the danger of escalation towards unpredictable level of conflict, violence, remains in such actions.
And the rhetoric of the political leadership in India was, of course, an outcome of very, very deeply felt anger and discontent about the horrific nature of the terrorist action against the soft target of tourists. Nevertheless, the rhetoric doesn't take into account the near conventional (military) parity that the two countries enjoy.
Also, India has to look at China -- the two front problem. China will always stand with Pakistan not only in moral terms, but also in military terms if required. So we have to factor that in.
You believe China could actually intervene in an India-Pakistan conflict?
It could create problems. You see, if there is a military standoff eyeball to eyeball on the western border, they (the Chinese) could create problems by making movements in the north, in our northeastern area, which could involve us tying down some forces there so that could stretch our military actions. That has to be factored in.
Are we losing the advantage by taking time over retaliation or are we actually retaining the advantage by keeping the Pakistani army on uncertain edge?
Well, again, the jury should be out on that. There is a surprise factor that will be there. They will be on tenterhooks, but this has limited validity.
The longer it takes, the suspense may wear off or there would be automatic de-escalation. So some action, if it has to be done, will have to be taken soon enough.
But then what it is or what it could be so that the escalation ladder is controlled, it's very difficult to say.
Is it possible for de-escalation to happen without actual military action like it happened after the Parliament attack and 26/11?
If sensible leadership is there and rhetoric is eschewed on both sides and there is also increased international pressure, it is possible. Why not?
One American observer pointed out on social media the other night that India did not get the expected support it wanted from allies and others on this issue.
Well, the reason for that is, you see, we have firstly not been able to apprehend the terrorists concerned in this specific action. They are still hiding and we have not been able to flush them out or get hold of them.
Secondly, the evidence in terms of electronic or technical inputs that we have in terms of the interceptions may not be of the order that could sufficiently establish the involvement of the Pakistani hand directly.
So that is one of the aspects which the Pakistanis may have succeeded in distancing their own institutions away from the actual implementation of the action that has been done.
And whatever talk that has been there with presence being found inside Pakistan as per media reports may still be of the nature that is not having or showing direct military involvement of Pakistan.
So that is why internationally it has not been possible to establish the same sort of support that we have been to do through diplomatic actions in the earlier years when Pakistan was in the grey list of the FATF.
So maybe we have to put back diplomatic pressure through concerted efforts again over the ensuing months to put back Pakistan onto the FATF grey list with the help of specific concrete evidence, bits and pieces collated over a period of time, which will have greater evidentiary value.
How would you rate our non kinetic (non military) responses so far? Have they been effective enough?
I think there have been very strong responses.
Keeping in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty is a very, very, strong action. Cutting off water is going to hurt Pakistan very badly. But there is the legal question -- whether the treaty at all permits keeping it in abeyance. So the jury is out on the legal interpretation of that one.
Of course, India has said that as circumstances of the relationship altered, then the treaty loses its value. So that is a viewpoint that can be put forward.
But again, you know, in the long term, natural flow of rivers cannot really be interrupted very drastically. And we have to remember that while here we are the upper riparian, in the east or the north, we are the lower riparian. So what we do to Pakistan, the Chinese could do to us, to our discomfiture.
And then again, we have other countries like Nepal and Bangladesh, where there is an element of water sharing with both these nations which reflect on the overall relationship that we have with these two neighbours. So that also has to be factored in.
If they see a parallel of the Indus Waters Treaty, that India can misbehave on water sharing issues, then both the Teesta Water, the Farraka Barrage, all these are going to come up in our already weakened relationship with Bangladesh. So it could cause further misunderstandings there.
We were fortunate during previous terror attacks to have supportive American presidents in the White House. Today we have an unpredictable man in charge who has not been as supportive of India after the Pahalgam attack.
Yes, that is true, but if we can prove concrete evidence of a terrorist hand, support from America would be forthcoming again.
The only thing is that they are quite distant. They are removed from the actual theatre of conflict and they are a little tired of this continuing India-Pakistan tensions. They would not like to get involved beyond a point. They have other pressing matters like the Ukraine conflict or the Middle East situation to deal with.
This will be an additional headache which they would want us to settle between ourselves without escalating the ladder towards nuclear confrontation.
So to that extent, American support would be forthcoming, but it cannot be taken as to bail us out completely to our advantage. I don't think that is going to happen.
Do you think that the Americans will provide their vast resources of intelligence to help us identify the perpetrators of this attack?
Again, history shows that they have been rather guarded in sharing of intelligence. Beyond a point they have not. It depends, from time to time, on the quality of the liaison sharing, intelligence sharing that has been there.
All this has had a further setback because of the Panun incident, the arrest of this Gupta person in the last one-and-a-half years and the high court judgment in the USA.
Now the current (US) government is prepared to overlook some of these things because they value our support regarding the overall relationship of the United States with China.
But whether they would improve the quality of intelligence regarding the theatre of conflict against Pakistan again is open to doubt.
They (the US) may play honest broker, they may share (intelligence) guardedly or they may not go all out to really get such intelligence which would paint Pakistan in a bad light. They may not want to do it.
But is Pakistan still an important ally for the US?
Certainly, oh yes, it is. They have the situation where remnants of al-Qaeda and ISIS are there in various parts of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan also. So they would like Pakistan to provide them eyes and ears to nab some of these elements from time to time.
They cannot afford to completely cut off the intelligence cooperation between the CIA and the ISI.
But is Pakistan still as valuable an American ally as it was earlier this century?
Well, they trust Pakistan less out of the manner in which they supported the Taliban -- Afghan Taliban -- in ousting the regime in Afghanistan. After that, there is a lack of trust. There has been a disruption of the weapons relationship.
But it hasn't completely disrupted either foreign training programmes or some military sales which are part of the maintenance of the F16s that the Americans have supplied in the past to Pakistan. So those would not be adversely affected.
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