'Looking at the situation purely on its Constitutional merits, the governor's conduct is defensible.'
'He is saying: You do not have a majority, so prove it. That is not an unreasonable position even if the timing and the political context make it deeply controversial.'

Key Points
- 'If no party has a clear majority, the governor is entitled to say: Show me the numbers first. That is a legitimate position.'
- 'The governor is not acting outside the Constitution. His position is: You do not have a majority, so show it to me. You cannot fault him purely on Constitutional grounds for saying that.'
- 'Courts cannot direct the governor on how to exercise his discretion.'
- 'It is the politicians' job to construct a majority, not the governor's. They have to sweat for it.'
"Politics is not static -- it is fluid and endlessly inventive. For every rule you frame, circumstances will arise that the rule did not foresee. You cannot legislate your way out of political uncertainty. That is, ultimately, a lesson the Constitution's framers knew well. It is one we have to keep relearning," P D T Achary, former secretary general of the Lok Sabha and one of India's foremost Constitutional scholars, tells Prasanna D Zore/Rediff.
In Tamil Nadu's power vacuum the rulebook seems to be playing against Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam chief Vijay who scripted a spectacular debut in Tamil Nadu politics by winning 108 seats.
Tamil Nadu woke up on May 4, 2026 to a result nobody had quite scripted. In the 234-seat assembly, Vijay's two-year-old Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam party won 108 seats -- the single largest tally, but ten seats short of the magic number of 118.
The Dravidian duopoly of the DMK and AIADMK, which had governed the state without interruption since 1967, lay shattered.
The DMK, which rode into power five years ago with 159 seats, was reduced to 59.
The Congress, its principal ally in the Secular Progressive Alliance, managed only five. Interestingly, some say opportunistically (the DMK has called Congress 'backstabber'), the five Congress MLAs had already sounded the TVK of its support to form the next government in the state.
Across the aisle, the AIADMK-BJP National Democratic Alliance won 53 seats between them -- the AIADMK taking 47 and the BJP a solitary seat in a state where it has long struggled to gain a foothold.
Outgoing Chief Minister M K Stalin, who had won the Kolathur constituency three times running, lost his seat. He resigned on May 5.
Into this vacuum stepped Vijay -- actor, first-time politician, and now the most consequential figure in Tamil politics. He met Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar at Lok Bhavan (formerly Raj Bhavan) twice to stake his claim.
Both times, the governor turned him away, insisting he produce letters of support from at least 118 MLAs before any appointment could be considered.
The TVK subsequently entered into a post-poll alliance with Congress, pulling the Congress away from the DMK-led bloc -- but the combined tally of 113 still fell short.
As of May 7, hectic parleys were under way, with Vijay convening a meeting of his newly elected legislators to chart a path forward.
The Governor's insistence on a prior demonstration of a majority has set off a fierce Constitutional debate.
Is he acting within his rights -- or is this the latest instance of a governor being used as a political instrument by the Centre?
'There are precedents on both sides. And that is precisely the problem'
The Tamil Nadu governor has refused to invite Vijay to form the government, asking him instead to first produce letters of support from 118 MLAs. Is there any Constitutional basis for this?

The governor does have discretion in this matter. This is precisely the stage at which that discretion can be exercised. But -- and this is important -- discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. It has to be used rationally.
The governor's Constitutional obligation is to ensure that a stable government is installed. That is the core of his duty. To fulfill it, he has to facilitate the process of government formation.
Now, if no party has a clear majority, the governor is entitled to say: Show me the numbers first. That is a legitimate position.
Alternatively, he can appoint someone as chief minister and ask that person to prove a majority on the floor of the House within a stipulated period. That too is permissible. Both options are available to him.
Has there been a precedent for the second approach -- appointing someone without a prior majority?
Yes. In 1996, President Shankar Dayal Sharma appointed Atal Bihari Vajpayee as prime minister even though his party, the BJP, had only 183 seats in a Lok Sabha that required 272 for a majority.
Vajpayee's bloc was the single largest grouping, and on that basis, Sharma allowed him to try. That government lasted 13 days -- Vajpayee could not prove his majority and had to resign.
The second time around, in 1998, Vajpayee went back to President K R Narayanan. Narayanan took a rather more cautious approach -- he asked Vajpayee to bring letters of support from all his allies before he would administer the oath.
Jayalalithaa was initially reluctant to sign, but eventually she fell in line. Once those letters came in, Narayanan was satisfied and Vajpayee was sworn in. That government ran its full term.
So there are precedents on both sides. And that is precisely the problem.
So what the Tamil Nadu governor has done is not unconstitutional?
Strictly speaking, no. He is not acting outside the Constitution. His position is: You do not have a majority, so show it to me. You cannot fault him purely on constitutional grounds for saying that.
'Bommai principle does not quite reach this stage of the process'
There is the S R Bommai judgment, which held that majority has to be proved on the floor of the House and not at Raj Bhavan. Does that not apply here?
That ruling has to be read in its proper context. The Bommai case dealt with a government that was already in office and had allegedly lost its majority. In that situation, the court said you cannot determine a majority in the governor's drawing room -- take it to the assembly. That principle is sound and correct.
But this is a different situation altogether. There is no incumbent government. The governor has to appoint a chief minister, and he is asking the claimant to first demonstrate that he has the numbers. The
The Bommai principle does not quite reach this stage of the process.
Is there not a convention that in a hung assembly, the governor must first invite the single largest party?
The convention, such as it is, follows a sequence: Look first for a pre-poll alliance, then for a post-poll alliance, and only if neither exists do you approach the single largest party.
Here, there is now a post-poll alliance -- the TVK has tied up with Congress. That makes a difference. The convention regarding the single largest party is for situations where no alliance of any kind exists.
The Sarkaria Commission (the 1983 commission headed by Justice R S Sarkaria that examined Centre-state relations and recommended guidelines for governors on government formation) laid down these guidelines, and the Supreme Court gave them its approval.
But -- and this is the crucial point -- courts cannot direct the governor on how to exercise his discretion. They can articulate norms; they cannot issue mandamus (a court order compelling a public authority to perform a specific legal duty) to a governor in matters that fall within his constitutional domain.
Does Vijay have any legal remedy? Can he move the high court or the Supreme Court?
I do not think so. Courts will not direct the governor to exercise his discretion in a particular manner. That is the nature of discretion -- it cannot be judicially prescribed. Vijay has no real legal remedy here. He has to resolve this politically.
Vijay's Options
Then what are Vijay's options?

He has to cast his net wider. If the Congress alliance gets him to 113, he is still five short. He will have to go knocking -- on the AIADMK's door, or any other willing party. Hard bargaining, difficult conversations, possibly uncomfortable compromises... That is what political life demands.
It is the politicians' job to construct a majority, not the governor's. They have to sweat for it.
And if no majority still materialises, then?
Then the governor has another option: impose President's Rule for a short period, keep the assembly in suspended animation, and allow the political negotiations to continue.
Deals that cannot be struck in a week may be struck in a month. The assembly stays alive, governments are not formed in haste, and eventually some formation emerges. It has happened before. It may happen here.
So you are saying the governor could be working towards exactly that outcome?
I am not speculating about his motives. That is for the politicians to determine and for the public to judge.
What I can say is that, looking at the situation purely on its Constitutional merits, the governor's conduct is defensible. He is saying: You do not have a majority, so prove it. That is not an unreasonable position even if the timing and the political context make it deeply controversial.
'The Constitution has left this to the politicians, and in a way, that is not entirely wrong'
Critics point to episodes in Karnataka in 2018, and in Maharashtra with the Fadnavis-Ajit Pawar swearing-in at dawn, as evidence that governors routinely act as instruments of the Centre. Is there not a structural flaw here?
Yes, governors have in many cases acted in a very arbitrary and partisan manner -- that is plain for all to see. And there is no consistent pattern.
In Karnataka (in 2018), the governor invited (B S) Yediyurappa with 105 seats and gave him 15 days to prove majority; the Supreme Court struck it down.
In Maharashtra, a chief minister was sworn in without any letters of support being produced. These episodes are not flattering to the institution.
But the reason this keeps happening is that government formation in a hung assembly lies within the domain of the governor's discretion, and it is genuinely difficult to frame hard rules for a discretionary power.
What rules do you frame for judgment? That is the Constitutional gap -- and it has been there since the Constitution was written.
Is there a legislative or Constitutional fix that could close this gap permanently?
I honestly do not know. If you take discretion away from the governor entirely, what do you replace it with? Who decides in a hung assembly?
The Constitution has left this to the politicians, and in a way, that is not entirely wrong. Politicians are enormously innovative people. We should not underestimate them. They will find a way where none seems to exist. They always do.
Thirty years after Bommai, governors in Opposition-ruled states continue to clash with elected governments. Has the judgment simply lost its deterrent force? Does India need a nine-judge bench or a Constitutional Amendment?
Whether it is a nine-judge bench or a thirteen-judge bench, there will always be situations that no judgment can fully anticipate.
Politics is not static -- it is fluid and endlessly inventive. For every rule you frame, circumstances will arise that the rule did not foresee. You cannot legislate your way out of political uncertainty. That is, ultimately, a lesson the Constitution's framers knew well.
It is one we have to keep relearning.
Photographs curated by Manisha Kotian/Rediff





