'He is intrigued by the intractability of the Kashmir issue.'
'With his interest in dealmaking and peacebrokering, he sees it as an exciting challenge to tackle.'
"One shouldn't think that some offhand comments by Trump are meant to define the way that Washington views India and the relationship with New Delhi," says Michael Kugelman, the Washington, DC-based South Asia expert who specialises in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and their relations with the United States.
"The question is if New Delhi, which is understandably upset, will be forgiving. After the dust settles -- New Delhi will likely view this as a case of 'Trump will be Trump' and look to move on," Dr Kugelman tells Rediff's Archana Masih.
The Indian government is peeved by the impression that this ceasefire came about because of American pressure.
Do you think the Trump administration is blind to Indian sensitivities and Indian aversion to third party mediation in Kashmir?
This is more than a mere case of Indian aversion to US mediation.
After all, there's a strong precedent of US diplomatic intervention in India-Pakistan military crises, and those prior mediations didn't upset India in a big way.
What's different this time around is how President Trump went public about the US role in the India-Pakistan ceasefire, and how he appears to have overstated the role that the US played.
For New Delhi, the fact that President Trump broadcast the third-party involvement in India's bilateral dispute has hit hard.
And, of course, Trump's call for a 'solution' on Kashmir -- something that a US president hasn't done for quite some time -- hits even harder.
Trump, in my view, doesn't mean any harm to India or to the relationship. I think he is intrigued by the intractability of the Kashmir issue, and, with his interest in dealmaking and peacebrokering, sees it as an exciting challenge to tackle.
I suspect that eventually, his comments -- which were off the cuff proclamations, and not a formal expression of policy -- will likely be walked back by his senior deputies.
Does this administration even care about this ally, a relationship which has been carefully constructed over successive governments?
The Trump administration is absolutely committed to partnership with India. It's filled to the brim with officials who genuinely want the partnership to succeed, and that includes Trump.
One shouldn't think that some offhand comments by Trump are meant to define the way that Washington views India and the relationship with New Delhi.
Of course, the question is if New Delhi, which is understandably upset, will be forgiving.
I suspect it will, not just because Prime Minister Modi and his government are just as committed to the US-India partnership as the Trump administration is, but also because -- after the dust settles -- New Delhi will likely view this as a case of 'Trump will be Trump' and look to move on.
What do you think went behind the ceasefire? Why did India not say no?
There's a lot we don't know about the ceasefire and how it came about.
My own view is that India didn't need to be pushed hard to agree to a ceasefire, whether by the US or anyone else.
By the time the US was intensifying its pitch to stop fighting, India had already achieved quite a lot -- from its hits on terrorist targets to its targeting of the strategic Nur Khan airbase.
In effect, by that point, it was in position to call it a day and look for off ramps, especially if it knew that Pakistan was being convinced by the US to end its own hostilities.
Trump may want us to think that it was US leverage and pressure tactics -- like trade and tariffs -- that got the two sides to stop fighting. And that may have played a role.
But I also think that India and Pakistan didn't necessarily need a lot of convincing at that point.
What surprised you most about this brief conflict, militarily and optics wise?
What surprised me the most is how quickly it escalated.
I had a feeling that we'd see more hostilities than we did in 2019; there had been an exponential increase in the use of force from 2016 to 2019, suggesting even more in this crisis.
But for the two sides to so quickly get to a point where they were sending drones and missiles deep into the other's territory to target military bases -- that was a surprise to me, and quite worrisome.
Will this Indian response compel the Pakistan army, ISI and its terrorists to lie low?
Will the Pakistan army risk harsh Indian military response after India's new doctrine that terror attacks will be responded by military action?
We need to look at the question of Pakistan's posture against the wider backdrop of Indian actions since the Pahalgam attack.
New Delhi appears to be playing a long game, and using a multifaceted set of pressure tactics to raise the costs for Pakistan of continuing to sponsor anti-India terrorists.
These include military tactics -- the high-intensity Indian air strikes we saw in recent days, and Prime Minister Modi's new vow that terrorist attacks will be followed by Indian military retaliations that could strike Pakistani military as well as terrorist targets.
But there are also the non-military steps -- the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, the ending of all trade, the pressure on Pakistan's donors to reduce assistance, and so on.
It is through all these tactics that India hopes to compel the Pakistani side to lie low and in time do more to curb the anti-India jihadists on its soil.
The Pakistan army was unable to prevent the Indian attack on their military airfields -- yet the post ceasefire mood in Pakistan is as if they have won a war.
Since Asim Munir has got what he wanted, with an IMF loan attached, will he settle for a more placid tenure?
Or will he continue to needle India to bring about American intervention in this region.
It's plain to see that Munir was one of the big winners from this crisis. The Pakistani public rallied around the military, bolstering what had been a beleaguered institution amid strong anti-army sentiment among the wider population.
India's strikes on Pakistan enabled Pakistan's military to position itself as Pakistan's protector in the face of Indian threats -- its stated raison d'etre -- which strengthened its legitimacy and credibility.
If Munir were smart, he would leverage this regained goodwill and focus renewed attention on tackling Pakistan's domestic problems, from economic stress --including potentially politically unpopular liberalisation reforms -- to surges in terrorism.
In that sense, trying to pick another fight with India would be counterproductive. But then again Munir is a hardliner on India -- most Pakistani army chiefs are, at the end of the day -- and he won't want to be seen as taking his eye off the ball in the aftermath of Modi's laying down new and more muscular terms governing India's approach to Pakistan.
What fresh security challenges does China's involvement in providing weapon assistance to Pakistan pose for India?
This is a real challenge for New Delhi. The Trump administration, by releasing nearly $400 million earlier this year to support a programme monitoring how US-made Pakistani F16s are used, has made clear that it doesn't want Pakistan deploying its jets against India.
Islamabad understands that, and knows that it will need to tap into its Chinese-made supplies. What happened during the recent conflict suggests that Beijing's military hardware can be quite effective.
There's also a broader takeaway here that's also concerning for New Delhi: Pakistan has been able to successfully diversify its sources of weapons suppliers.
It may not be depending on American weaponry now, but it can count on Chinese equipment, as well as Turkish-made drones, to target India.
Of course, India has long had the luxury of a diversified set of suppliers, branching out from Russia to include the US, France, and Israel, among others.
But this is no longer the big advantage for India that it used to be, amid Pakistan's efforts to catch up and try to achieve parity on this front.
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