'The Maoist leadership spread fear that surrender meant torture or death. Once that false narrative collapsed and our operations proved transparent and credible, the surrender momentum became irreversible.'
'From 42,000 square kilometres, Maoist activity is now confined to barely 500-600 square kilometres -- less than two per cent of Bastar. This is their last remaining base area.'

"By the end of March there will be no base area left for the CPI (Maoist) to carry out their activities," Bastar Inspector General of Police Sundarraj P tells Prasanna D Zore/Rediff in the concluding part of the interview.
With the Maoist area of influence reduced from 42,000 square kilometres to merely 500-600 square kilometres -- less than two per cent of Bastar's geographical area.
IGP Sundarraj outlines the five-pronged strategy combining operational intensity, development initiatives, connectivity infrastructure, confidence-building measures and opportunity to native population in administration and security of their own region.
Some critics argue that heavy encounters discourage surrenders. Yet Bastar has witnessed a huge number of Maoists laying down their arms and surrendering before the government.
How do you explain this paradox? What measures were undertaken by Bastar Police, as well as the Chhattisgarh government, to build confidence amongst the Maoists that they can surrender?
We have been making this appeal continuously. There was a narrative, particularly from the top Maoist leadership -- those from outside Chhattisgarh, from Telangana and other places -- who set a false narrative amongst the lower-level formations.
They told them that if they came into contact with the police, they would be subjected to torture or eliminated. That was the narrative set by the top leaders to misguide and control the lower level cadres.
We have tried to make the lower level cadres realise that this is not the case. The government is ready to accept anyone who realises that they should not continue on the path of violence. We have also involved the community.
The village and tribal leaders have conveyed this message to the family members of the cadres, and they have facilitated many surrenders.
The credibility and transparency of our operations have ensured that it is safe to come forward, hand over weapons, and surrender before the state.
The credibility factor and the transparency with which we have operated, combined with other factors -- such as the leadership being depleted and the realisation setting in that there is no future for this armed rebel movement -- have all contributed.
Once the momentum was initiated, it gained considerable speed over the past couple of years.
Now that the Maoists are in decline, almost decimated, what are the immediate priorities before the Bastar police? Would it be stronger security action, or faster development and governance outreach?
We are following a five-pronged strategy. One of these five strategies is the operational front, where our specialised groups -- Special Task Force, District Reserve Guard, Bastar Fighters, CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action, a specialised unit of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) for jungle warfare and anti-insurgency) and other central paramilitary forces are operating together and producing favourable operational outcomes.
The second is the development strategy. We have opened numerous camps in the interior areas, and each camp is acting as an integrated development centre.
The third is the connectivity strategy. We are working to connect the local population to the outside world. For this, we have established numerous mobile towers. The youth are now getting connected to the outside world and are able to learn what is happening in other parts of the country and the world. That connectivity is being ensured.
The fourth strategy is to provide an opportunity to the local population to have an active role in the safety and security of their own region.
We have inducted a significant number of local personnel into the security forces and other government departments so that they can be part of the process, rather than merely observing from outside. They are now part of the entire process.
The fifth element is confidence-building measures. Earlier, there was a widening gap between the population and the government. Now, through various community outreach programmes, we are bridging that gap.
All these factors together constitute the five-pronged strategy, and this has produced favourable outcomes. Hopefully, for the next couple of years, this will remain our priority.
Can you say that, by the end of 2025, 90 to 95 per cent of areas that were under Maoist influence have come back into the mainstream?
Out of the 42,000 square kilometres in the Bastar region, they are now left with only approximately 500 to 600 square kilometres -- which is less than 2 per cent of the total geographical area -- where we can still observe their activity.
This is the last remaining base area. We are hopeful of clearing those areas as well within another couple of months.
By the end of March there will be no base area left for the CPI (Maoist) to carry out their activities.
What role did sophisticated technology, as well as local support and intelligence from locals who assisted the police against the Maoists, play in these operations?

For security concerns, we won't be able to discuss in detail the technological aspects used during these operations. However, I can assure you that the (Union) government (and the government of Chhattisgarh) has provided adequate support in terms of equipment and troops to meet the operational challenges -- whether it is the mobility of security forces, enhancement of firepower, air support for evacuation of injured personnel, logistical support in core areas, or other technological provisions. Due to security concerns, we are not in a position to disclose specifics.
Nevertheless, the government has been very particular that there should be no shortcomings and no handicaps for our forces due to lack of infrastructure or technology. That has been the bottom line.
Our ground troops have received the best training in jungle warfare and the best intelligence inputs. All these factors combined have enabled us to produce remarkable outcomes over the past couple of years.
Do you believe Bastar is now near a tipping point where Maoism can be decisively defeated, or is this fight still a protracted one, even though the Maoists have been decimated?
The top Maoist leadership, who were previously advocating for this armed rebellion and claiming they could bring about a revolutionary form of government, have themselves realised that this is not going to happen.
That is why, as I mentioned earlier, a huge number of top leaders -- central committee members and politburo members who have been advocating this ideology for the past 40 years -- have decided to come forward and join the mainstream.
We do not foresee any reason for the resurgence of this movement. Their leadership has been totally eliminated, and the local population is not going to support any such violent activity within a democratic system of governance.
People have the right to freedom of expression. They can express their ideas, their consent, and their discontent -- all of this is possible within the legal and democratic framework. However, they are not going to embrace the violent pathway that the CPI (Maoist) was advocating. We are very certain about that.
There would also be a significant development push in the forthcoming period, so that people who have joined the mainstream can decide for themselves what is good and better for them. The democratic institutions will gain strength in the days to come.
Even in January 2025, we held local body elections across the region, including areas where there used to be zero per cent polling. Now, those areas have also witnessed elections. People are conducting the elections.
Young men and women who are educated are coming forward to become sarpanchs and members of panchayats in these areas. We are witnessing positive indications towards the strengthening of democratic institutions.
Hopefully, in the days to come, Bastar will flourish with a new identity.
After major gains against Maoists in the last two years, what is your roadmap for 2026 in Bastar -- both in terms of security operations and winning the trust of local communities?

As Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, I can assert that building on the decisive achievements of the past two years, we have taken a firm resolve for 2026 to eliminate the remaining Maoist networks and establish lasting peace in Bastar.
Our focus in 2026 will be to take the peace-restoration process to its decisive stage through well-planned strategies, effective action, and sustained operations.
At the same time, we will implement the rehabilitation policy for citizens and youth affected by Naxalite violence in a humane, sensitive, and inclusive manner, with renewed efforts to integrate them into the mainstream of development.
Equal priority will be given to security, development, and trust-building. In close coordination with the local administration and all stakeholders, we will intensify efforts to ensure last-mile delivery of government welfare schemes, expand infrastructure, and strengthen access to education, healthcare, and employment.
Through police-public partnership, dialogue, and social harmony, we aim to ensure that Bastar leaves behind the legacy of fear and violence and moves decisively toward a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future.
With Resolve 2026, Bastar will emerge beyond its identity of conflict and stand as a strong symbol of peace, trust, and development.
Photographs curated by Manisha Kotian/Rediff






