'If they aim to remain aligned with the public sentiment, as any democratic government should, then they must respond. Why else would the prime minister have cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia? And why would he have instructed the home minister himself to travel to Srinagar to assess the situation firsthand? This suggests that something is indeed being planned. I am quite certain of that, although the exact form it will take remains to be seen.'
In a blistering indictment of India's counterterrorism posture, Maj Gen (retd) G D Bakshi warns that the recent Pahalgam massacre, which claimed 26 Indian lives, was enabled by complacency, troop drawdowns, and a dangerous misreading of the ground situation in Jammu and Kashmir.
Speaking hours after PM Modi's emergency security meetings, Bakshi called for a decisive military response -- not symbolic airstrikes or covert tit-for-tat tactics.
"The Pakistani military is the prime terrorist organisation in that country," he says, urging New Delhi to abandon illusions and prepare for full-spectrum retaliation.
Drawing upon his extensive experience in counterinsurgency and command in Kashmir, Bakshi highlights the potential intelligence failures and the consequences of troop reductions in critical areas.
In this two-part interview with Prasanna D Zore/Rediff.com, his analysis extends to the broader geopolitical context, including Prime Minister Modi's visit to Saudi Arabia and the historical pattern of terror attacks coinciding with significant international engagements.
Ultimately, Gen Bakshi issued a powerful call to action, urging the political leadership to abandon hesitant approaches and deliver a decisive, impactful response that deters further adventurism and reassures the nation of its security. He emphasises that this moment demands a clear message: India will not tolerate such acts without inflicting severe consequences on Pakistan.
How do you interpret the strategic intent of the terrorists and their masterminds behind targeting Indian tourists in Pahalgam?
The strategic intent (of the terrorists and their masterminds and controllers) is a slap in your face, isn't it? I understand that one of the terrorists shot an Indian woman's husband. Subsequently, when the the bereaved woman asked why they wouldn't shoot her, having already killed her husband, the terrorist reportedly refused. This was cited on television channels yesterday.
So, it seems Pakistan is attempting something significant.
Firstly, it's the most outrageous provocation.
Secondly, it targets a highly sensitive area because Pahalgam serves as the primary base for Amarnath Yatra, along with Baltal.
Every year, we would conduct sanitisation operations in this region to secure the area and prevent any untoward incidents during the Amarnath Yatra. However, with this mass casualty strike, the current situation is unclear. The latest count I heard last night was 28 fatalities; till yesterday they were only talking about more injured people and lesser number of deaths.
It's perplexing why there seems to be a discrepancy. There's a concept called situational awareness. Yesterday, we were initially informed that one, possibly two individuals had been wounded. This then escalated to eight wounded, followed by one death and 20 wounded, and now it stands at 26 or 28. Why can't we be straightforward and honest with the people of India?
Do you believe that by releasing the information incrementally, there's an attempt to downplay the severity of the incident?
Yes, and perhaps to excuse themselves from a strong reaction. I'm sorry, but a significant reaction is necessary. And this time, a mere token surgical strike or a single airstrike will not suffice, as it won't be enough to deter Pakistan from further acts of adventurism.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already convened a series of high-level meetings with the national security advisor, the external affairs minister, and the home minister, all within a matter of hours. What does this indicate about the government's internal assessment of the situation? And how do you perceive the government's position relative to public sentiment on this issue?
The government cannot afford to deviate from the public mood in this regard.
I frankly fail to understand the rationale for continuing the ceasefire on the Line of Control. It was implemented during General Qamar Jawed Bajwa's tenure because he had pleaded with us, expressing his desire to avoid a war with India, among other things. He then exploited this ceasefire to shape the narrative in Afghanistan, portraying the Taliban as warlords who had achieved strategic depth. They essentially used the ceasefire to their advantage, focusing on their western borders instead of their eastern ones.
So, the fundamental truth is that we must retaliate. We have no option but to strike back.
India's response needs to be forceful. It is heartbreaking to witness innocent Indian women weeping beside their deceased husbands. How long will this tragic cycle continue? It must be stopped.
This terrorist attack occurs within a week of Pakistan's General Asim Munir's statement about Kashmir being Pakistan's 'jugular vein'. Do you believe this attack is a direct consequence of that speech?
It has undoubtedly emboldened terrorists within Pakistan who were looking for an opportunity to strike. Let's cease this pretence that the Pakistani army and the Pakistani State are not involved in these terror attacks.
For goodness sake, it is the Pakistani army and the ISI that are orchestrating all of this. We should stop trying to draw this imaginary distinction between State and non-State actors. It is the Pakistani military that is the primary terrorist organisation in that country, spreading terrorism globally. Any terrorist attack anywhere in the world can be traced back to Pakistan.
You have consistently advocated for stronger retaliation. In your opinion, what should be India's immediate and long-term military or covert response to this attack?
In India, we seem to have reached a conclusion that the only appropriate response to covert operations is through covert operations, which has a limited degree of effectiveness.
However, there are inherent risks and complications in this approach, as we are witnessing with the Khalistani terrorists and the situation we've become entangled in within the United States.
We must be capable of responding across the entire spectrum of power. I see no compelling reason to restrict ourselves solely to a covert-for-covert strategy.
Do you believe that the political leadership in Delhi is now contemplating such action, specifically a direct action against Pakistan?
If they aim to remain aligned with the public sentiment, as any democratic government should, then they must respond. Why else would the prime minister have cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia? And why would he have instructed the home minister himself to travel to Srinagar to assess the situation firsthand? This suggests that something is indeed being planned. I am quite certain of that, although the exact form it will take remains to be seen.
We have discussed the possibility of reclaiming Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir for so long. Perhaps this is the opportune moment to act. The entire international community would likely be in our favour.
Numerous countries are expressing sympathy and support. When else could we hope for greater international backing? Even without universal international support, I don't believe a nation of India's size should back down.
I am choosing my words carefully here -- we cannot afford to back down from this. We must retaliate. And that means, for heaven's sake, we must maintain preparedness. Anything can happen at any time.
The international environment is becoming increasingly uncertain and perilous. We were already facing a two-front war scenario, and now a potential three-front situation is emerging with the inclusion of Bangladesh.
It's more like a three-and-a-half front war when you consider the challenges in our rear and the activities of Pakistanis in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast, among other emerging threats that demand our swift response.
Furthermore, as a veteran, one of the most pressing issues I must raise is the reduction of the army by 180,000 personnel during COVID. This is a massive cut over three years. It's astonishing. On what basis was this decision made?
The size of the army should be determined by the threats we face. Who decided, and when, that the army has excess manpower and needs to be reduced? This seems utterly illogical for a country with 1.4 billion people, where a significant portion of the population is under 26 and in need of employment. It's baffling that we are simultaneously facing a need for jobs and reducing the workforce.
Then we observe the Russia-Ukraine war. Is Russia lacking in weapons? A rather simplistic theory is being circulated here: let's not invest in manpower; let's use those funds to purchase weapons.
Firstly, we aren't actually acquiring the weapons. Where are the additional Rafale aircraft? Where are the fifth-generation fighters? Our Air Force squadron strength is down to 30 when it should be at least 42, and arguably 45 or more given the escalating threats. We have recently inducted the ATAGS (Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System), thankfully an indigenously produced gun. But why only 300? In such a precarious environment, we should be aiming for 1300, as we are short on firepower.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has clearly demonstrated that artillery and drones are critical war-winning factors.
Given your extensive experience in counterinsurgency operations, what does this attack reveal about the current operational capabilities and intelligence infrastructure of terrorist outfits in Kashmir? Would you consider this an intelligence failure on par with the Pulwama attack?
Absolutely, it is an intelligence failure. I mean, how can the deaths of our people be considered an intelligence success?
The second critical factor is that, as I mentioned earlier, we have thinned out our presence in certain sensitive areas of Jammu and Kashmir based on a false premise that the conflict has been won, that everything is settled. Consequently, we've reduced the army's strength in Rajouri, Poonch, Reasi, Kathua, or Udhampur. The reductions were made in Kishtwar, the very region from where this operation is believed to have been launched, and in Doda.
I previously commanded the Kishtwar sector, where at one point we had up to five battalions. Today, I hope there are still three battalions stationed there. Furthermore, the Kishtwar garrison has been assigned the additional responsibility of overseeing Bhaderwah and Doda, which was previously a separate sector. So, essentially, we have weakened our presence in the most dangerous areas -- mountainous and densely forested regions where terrorists can easily disappear -- effectively creating a welcoming environment for them to attack.
We have laid down a red carpet, inviting them to come and strike. I must also express my dismay at the attitude of our police chief (Nalin Prabhat, the DGP of Jammu & Kashmir), who seems to believe that the army is unnecessary and even asserts that he will instruct the army on how to fight. He wants them out of the way. These are bold pronouncements; let's see them materialise on the ground.