'Tamil Nadu Has Produced Most Dramatic Political Debut'

'This is a major rupture in Tamil Nadu's political order.
'For the Dravidian parties, the message is clear: The old DMK-AIADMK binary is no longer guaranteed a future.'

"Can TVK convert charisma into organisation? Tamil Nadu has seen film stars become political forces before, but lasting power requires cadres, welfare imagination, caste management, and ideological clarity," explains Political Scientist Dr Uday Chandra.

Dr Chandra is a field researcher of politics and society and holds a MA, MPhil and PhD in political science from Yale University.

"If Vijay builds those, he can reshape the state. If not, this may become a spectacular, but unstable wave," Dr Chandra tells Rediff's Archana Masih in the first of a two-part interview, discussing the TVK's spectacular debut in Tamil Nadu, Bengal entering the age of competitive Hindutva with the BJP's convincing victory and the most serious crisis confronting Mamata Banerjee in her long political career.

What do you make of Vijay's stunning debut and what does this mean for the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu?

Vijay's debut is extraordinary. TVK won over 100 seats, crossing the threshold for party recognition in its very first election. This is a major rupture in Tamil Nadu's political order.

For the Dravidian parties, the message is clear: The old DMK-AIADMK binary is no longer guaranteed a future.

Vijay appears to have attracted young voters, first-time voters, urban and semi-urban aspirational groups, and those tired of both established Dravidian formations.

He has not abolished Dravidian politics entirely though.

Can TVK convert charisma into organisation? Tamil Nadu has seen film stars become political forces before, but lasting power requires cadres, welfare imagination, caste management, and ideological clarity.

If Vijay builds those, he can reshape the state. If not, this may become a spectacular, but unstable wave.

For now, though, Tamil Nadu has produced the most dramatic political debut in recent memory. The Dravidian parties will be compelled to take him seriously.

What are the factors -- political, social, cultural, religious -- that account for the BJP's win in West Bengal?

The BJP's victory in Bengal is the result of anti-incumbency, Hindu consolidation, institutional advantages vis-a-vis Constitutional bodies, and a cultural promise of change all coming together.

After fifteen years of TMC rule, there was genuine fatigue with local corruption, cadre dominance, recruitment scandals, political violence, and the everyday arrogance of ruling party networks.

The BJP converted this resentment into a broader argument, namely, that Bengal needed liberation from 'syndicate raj' and political fear.

But this was not merely an anti-incumbency election. The BJP also succeeded in making religious identity electorally salient across large parts of Bengal. It brought together Bengali Hindu anxieties over minority appeasement, border security, and citizenship.

In some regions, especially north Bengal and border districts such as Malda, these anxieties merged with local grievances over demographic change.

At the same time, we should note that the BJP softened its earlier outsider (bohiragoto image. It projected a Bengali-friendly Hindutva, used local leaders more effectively, and turned cultural issues (Durga Puja, fish/meat, and everyday Bengali identity) into contested terrain.

This time, the BJP did not ask Bengal to become like the Hindi heartland. It argued instead that Bengal's own Hindu inheritance had been suppressed by the TMC and the Left Front over the past half century.

Of course, none of this would materialise if the Election Commission had remained neutral. The dubious category of 'logical discrepancies', used only in West Bengal, disenfranchised 27 lakh voters in a single stroke.

Even the remaining 64 lakh voters deleted are a concern. We lack transparent data on how many died, how many were duplicate entries, and how many shifted out of the state.

The antagonistic approach to the TMC and its representatives was also unprecedented. To single out one party, and then, to change bureaucrats and police officers and to deploy the army and paramilitary forces during elections stands as a blot on the EC's reputation.

What has been the single biggest driver of this big victory?

The single biggest driver was the conversion of anti-incumbency into Hindu consolidation. Anger against the TMC's local machinery was imbued with a religious vocabulary.

Corruption, crime, recruitment scams, minority appeasement and infiltration were woven into a single narrative: The TMC had distorted Bengal's social fabric and only the BJP could restore order.

But Hindu consolidation occurred after the Special Intensive Revision in the state. Even if we cannot claim that SIR decided the election, there is no doubt that it changed the terrain of contestation.

91 lakh voters were removed during the revision of rolls, before supplementary additions took the final count slightly upward. That is nearly 12% of the existing electorate.

In a close or polarised election, such a large roll revision invariably affects political confidence and perceptions of fairness. It also enables strategic voting among fence sitters in favour of an expected winner, which, of course, played into Hindu consolidation.

As such, I regard 'SIR + Hindu consolidation' as a two-step BJP poll strategy in much the same way as 'SIR + Nitish + ₹10,000' acted as a NDA campaign package in Bihar six months ago.

How would you assess the BJP's long-term strategy since the last assembly election? What worked this time that did not work last time?

Since 2021, the BJP has worked systematically on three weaknesses.

First, it deepened its booth-level organisation.

Second, it localised its messaging.

Third, it waited for TMC's accumulated liabilities to ripen.

In 2021, Mamata Banerjee successfully made the election about Bengal versus outsiders. The BJP looked powerful, but also culturally intrusive. Its campaign was too visibly crafted in Delhi.

This time, the BJP stayed patient. It relied on central leadership, but did not depend only on it. It cultivated local defectors, district-level influencers, caste/community networks, Matua constituencies, and north Bengal grievances.

What worked this time was what I call 'adaptive Hindutva'. The BJP learned to speak Bengal's political language more fluently. It presented itself as culturally Hindu.

It also said: We will end corruption, restore order, protect Hindu interests, and bring central welfare more efficiently. That combination proved more powerful than the aggressive outsider-style campaign of 2021.

• Part II: 'BJP Will Have To Show It Can Govern Bengal Without...'