'Militarily, it risks escalating tensions with Pakistan, potentially triggering conflict due to Pakistan's heavy reliance on the Indus.'
In the second part of this interview with Rediff's Prasanna D Zore, Uttam Kumar Sinha, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analtyes, New Delhi and the author of the book Indus Basin Uninterrupted, says India's decision to freeze the Indus Waters Treaty isn't just diplomatic theatre -- it threatens Pakistan's lifeline.
Some 90% of Pakistan's farming, drinking water and hydropower hinge on Indus flows, Sinha points out. Sindh's canal tail-ends would be hit first, risking crop failures, food inflation and rural unrest.
Pakistan has no alternative sources large enough to cushion the blow, while India still lacks the dams and link canals to fully capture western-river waters. The result: A strategic threat with real human stakes, but one India can only turn into an operational lever years down the line.
How critical is the Indus river system for Pakistan's agriculture, economy, and drinking water? Could suspension genuinely cripple sectors of Pakistan's economy?
The Indus river system is existential for Pakistan. Roughly 90% of Pakistan's agricultural activity depends on the waters of the Indus Basin. This river system supports not only farming but also provides drinking water to major cities and sustains key sectors like energy (through hydropower) and industry.
Agriculture contributes around 20% of Pakistan's GDP and employs over 35% of the workforce. Any disruption in irrigation flows could severely dent both rural livelihoods and national food security.
Moreover, Pakistan's water storage infrastructure is far from robust. With limited reservoir capacity and a heavy reliance on seasonal flows, the country has little buffer against disruptions.
Which parts of Pakistan would be most immediately vulnerable to water shortages if India restricts or delays water flows?
Yes, Sindh in Pakistan is most vulnerable to water shortages.
The water dispute between Sindh and Punjab in Pakistan is rooted in the unequal distribution of the Indus river's resources, which both provinces heavily depend on for irrigation and agriculture. Punjab, being the more agriculturally advanced region, has historically controlled a larger share of the water, leaving Sindh, which relies on the Indus for its livelihood, with a smaller portion.
This imbalance has led to repeated tensions (between Sindh and Punjab in Pakistan) over water allocation. Sindh claims that its share of water from the Indus river has been reduced due to the construction of dams and irrigation systems in (West) Punjab (which is in Pakistan).
(West) Punjab (which is in Pakistan), on the other hand, argues that its infrastructure and agricultural productivity justify its larger share of water, and that the overall water management system is necessary for national food security and economic development.
Does Pakistan have alternative sources of water that could offset any Indian pressure on the Indus system?
In short, no -- Pakistan lacks viable alternative sources that could meaningfully offset any Indian pressure on the Indus river system.
The Indus and its tributaries account for about 90% of Pakistan's freshwater supply, making the country one of the most river-dependent in the world.
There is no comparable domestic source -- surface or underground -- that could replace the volumes provided by the Indus system.
In sum, Pakistan has no strategic fallback if India were to exert pressure on upstream flows.
However, India too faces limitations: It currently lacks the large-scale water infrastructure needed to store, divert, or significantly disrupt flows to Pakistan in a sustained or impactful way.
Does India have the infrastructure ready -- dams, storage, canals -- to actually use the waters it will withhold from Pakistan, or will it be symbolic pressure? If not, how long before this infrastructure can be put in place.
As of now, India lacks the full infrastructure needed to immediately divert or store significant volumes of Indus waters -- especially from the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).
Estimates suggest it could take 5 to 10 years for India to develop sufficient storage and diversion infrastructure -- provided political will, funding, and environmental clearances align.
In short, India has not yet the physical tools to fully exercise them.
Could India's control over Indus waters become a form of sustained strategic leverage over Pakistan in future conflicts?
India's control over the Indus waters could indeed serve as a strategic leverage in future conflicts, as water is a critical resource.
Given the dependence of Pakistan on the Indus river system for agriculture and power, India could use its position to exert pressure, especially if tensions rise.
What are the political and military risks for India in weaponising water? Is there a point where it could backfire diplomatically or escalate tensions?
Weaponising water poses serious political and military risks for India. Politically, it could tarnish India's global reputation as a manipulator of vital resources, inviting widespread criticism.
Militarily, it risks escalating tensions with Pakistan, potentially triggering conflict due to Pakistan's heavy reliance on the Indus.
Such actions could also destabilise the region and undermine long-term cooperation.
- Part 3 of the Interview: 'Counter-Productive For India To Create Upstream And Downstream Acrimony'
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