'Within minutes, my mobile began ringing. It was National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, asking why the Iranians were complaining.'
'I explained that we had only restated our position in the light of the conclusion reached by the IAEA, but will remain helpful to Iran to reach a consensus.'
'Then came a call from Foreign Secretary Kamal Sibal, repeating what Mishra said about the Iranian complaint.'
'I was very impressed that Iran was able to reach two top officials in India to intervene at short notice,' recalls Ambassador T P Sreenivasan.
The Iranian nuclear saga, which reached a critical stage recently with the American bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities, was a preoccupation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2002 to 2004 when I was the Governor for India of the Agency.
After the initial shock over the revelation that Iran was engaged in developing nuclear weapons, an effort was made to confine Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in return for lifting western sanctions.
Iran would cooperate with the IAEA to prove that it was not engaged in any activity to develop nuclear weapons.
As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran was expected to extend such cooperation.
Before beginning negotiations with Europeans, China, Russia and the US, Iran called several meetings of the Nonaligned Group to formulate a paper supporting the Iranian position that it had the right to enrich uranium under the provisions of the NPT and that no action should be taken against Iran.
We maintained our general position that signatories to the NPT should refrain from engaging in nuclear activities, which may be construed as weapon oriented.
In the meantime, an inspection team of the IAEA, which visited Iran had reported to the director general of the IAEA that though there was no evidence about unlawful enrichment, the team had noticed some suspicious activities which could not be explained fully by the Iranians.
When the NAM Group met to consider the situation, I had told the Iranian ambassador privately that India would support Iran's right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the terms of the NPT, but could not support any Iranian activity which could be construed by the IAEA as weapon oriented.
The Iranian ambassador appeared to understand our position, but he requested me to advise New Delhi to take a helpful line at NAM.
Sitting next to the Iranian delegates in the alphabetical order on the Board, I had several discussions with Iranian representatives, ranging from their foreign minister to the first secretary.
I gained the impression that Iran was envious of India's nuclear policy and that they would like to build a nuclear deterrent as we had done.
They kept telling me in these discussions that they would eventually expect India to stand beside them because of our traditional links and current good relations.
Our discussions were cordial, but I left them in no doubt that we had a position, which would be supportive of more inspections by the IAEA to prove Iran's innocence.
The discussion between the West with Iran continued even as Iran was trying to get a clean chit from the IAEA.
One day, the Iranian ambassador told me that India's position was crucial in avoiding sanctions against Iran and requested to persuade Delhi to support it.
I repeated that I would request Iran to allow inspections not to embarrass itself if any evidence of high enrichment emerged.
Several NAM members, however, were not ready to support the Iranian position in the NAM.
One night, in the final consultations between NAM and Iran, I reiterated the Indian position, adding that I hoped that Iran would understand the Indian position.
The Iranian ambassador did not press the point. But within minutes, my mobile began ringing and I went out of the room to answer the call.
It was none other than then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, asking why the Iranians were complaining.
I explained that we had only restated our position in the light of the conclusion reached by the IAEA, but will remain helpful to Iran to reach a consensus.
Mishra agreed, but then came a call from Foreign Secretary Kamal Sibal, repeating what Mishra said about the Iranian complaint.
I told him also that we will maintain our position, but remain as helpful as possible to reach a consensus.
As it happened, Iran itself did not pursue the point since there were some others also in NAM who were not in favour of a NAM consensus on the issue. But I was very impressed that Iran was able to reach two top officials in India to intervene at short notice.
The next morning, when the Iranian ambassador met me at the Board meeting, I said that I had noticed that he had "set the Ganges on fire" the previous night.
The ambassador initially was bewildered, but then laughed heartily. Since then, whenever we had some disagreement on any issue, he would threaten to "set the Ganges on fire" again!
India and Iran had many views in common and we used to help each other on the issues before the Board. But I realised on that fateful night the enormous influence they wielded in India through powerful Shia leaders in Parliament and elsewhere.
Ambassador T P Sreenivasan is a long-time contributor to Rediff.com.
You can read his earlier columns here.
Feature Presentation: Rajesh Alva/Rediff