'China Is Competing In A Space Where India Was Dominant'

'These efforts by Beijing can be weaponised one day with economic, security and political implications for India.'

China's activities in South Asia are both visible and opaque, competing in a space India used to dominate.

In an edited report that covers different aspects of Beijing's engagement with South Asia, Constantino Xavier, senior fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress, and Jabin Jacob, associate professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar Institute of Eminence, say India needs to build strategic capacity to better assess demand from neighbours and then deliver on time.

Aditi Phadnis/Business Standard caught up with them in an interview partly on e-mail.

Your latest report How China Engages South Asia: In the Open and Behind the Scenes is out. What are its findings?

The 12 case studies show that China is expanding the themes and number of partners it is engaging as well as building on its tools to enhance influence across South Asia.

It is openly competing in a space where India's role used to be predominant.

Beyond the hard and more visible dimensions of trade, investment, or defence supplies, we show that China's engagements also operate on softer dimensions that shape the governance, including legal regimes, politics, and perceptions in countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

These efforts and investment by Beijing can be leveraged or even weaponised one day with obvious economic, security and political implications for India.

Whether scholarships, conflict mediation or covert influence operations, the pieces align with each other and contribute to a broader Chinese endgame.

Even when faced with obstacles, China is quick to learn lessons, and deploy new instruments.

A case in point is how it engages Nepal's northern border provinces.

We observe a China capable of adapting and becoming increasingly comfortable engaging with diverse political systems and actors in South Asia -- civil society, political parties, media, academia, religious associations, industry, etc.

We argue there is much that India and others can learn here in terms of diplomatic strategies and range of engagements.

Isn't it true that there's also pushback from many South Asian countries?

For instance, in Nepal in the past decade, while many districts had begun offering school-level instruction in Mandarin by Chinese teachers, they have since had to leave for lack of demand.

There is also anecdotal evidence that many Tibetan-financed Buddhist temples are coming up.

In short, while there is greater Chinese engagement, there are also limitations to it ... Yet, limitations to Chinese influence exist.

South Asian countries are not passive bystanders to China's engagement strategies.

In some cases, we see them courting, pulling Beijing in, whether to support their developmental ambitions or to increase their bargaining power with India.

Nepal under Oli, Bangladesh under Hasina and Yunus, Sri Lanka under the Rajapaksas, and the Maldives under Yameen and Muizzu have all played this balancing game with mixed results.

And that explains the shifting tide you describe: While China remains popular, it is no longer seen as the ever benign saviour and heroic solver of all problems.

For instance?

China was missing in action during the Sri Lankan financial crisis.

Its Border Road Initiative project deliveries in Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh are limited in terms of quantity and quality.

And with the arrival of Chinese State-owned enterprises and other actors, stakeholders in South Asia have begun raising concerns about Chinese development and governance norms, including conditionalities.

Yet while the Chinese grass does not look so green anymore, decision-makers in the region continue to face limited choices and are still banking on Beijing to deliver assistance and solutions, especially as traditional partners from the West are disengaging.

Does the success of Chinese engagement mean India's 'Neighbourhood First' policy needs a reset?

Our other studies show that in terms of volume and levels of engagement in the neighbourhood, except for Pakistan, India is today delivering better and faster than ever before, except maybe for the 1950s.

But this is a different neighbourhood, far more open and competitive, placing unprecedented demands on India and others.

So in relative terms, India's delivery capacity is still not good enough: With China and other actors rising as an alternative, India's neighbours also have greater demands from it.

They now expect India to deliver faster and more substantially.

Rather than resetting or redefining policies, India will have to build strategic capacity to better assess demand from neighbours and then deliver on time: This is where there are some lessons to be learnt from our case studies.

From the Dalai Lama to Sheikh Hasina, India has hosted leaders in exile and has become a factor in the domestic politics of foreign countries. Is China going down the same road?

After a relative lull in Chinese intervention in the domestic politics of other countries, Beijing is back to the practice -- even if its objectives might be different from the Maoist era.

China under the Communist Party has ideological objectives in ensuring other political systems and norms align with its own.

And increasingly, China is demanding such alignment, given its competition with the US and with those it sees as aligned to the US, like India.

Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff