So it wasn't a case of being third time lucky. Another attempt at concluding the 'Doha Round' of negotiations aimed at liberalizing world trade, particularly in agricultural goods, collapsed yet again.
For a while it seemed as if World Trade Organisation Director General Pascal Lamy's proposals of July 25, because they led to some forward movement, might do the trick. Sweeteners had been added -- the European Union and the United States of America had offered to consider more temporary work visas for skilled professionals, something that has been a long-standing Indian demand.
Special deals with individual countries with specific interests were being struck -- divide and rule at its best.
But suddenly China and India dug in their heels and accusations began flying thick and fast. After the collapse, there has been no shortage of rhetoric: The US blames China and India for being 'overly protective;' China says that the US was 'asking a price as high as heaven;' and India says that while the US was 'looking at enhancing its commercial interests' India was 'looking at protecting the livelihood of farmers.'
But for once there might be substance to rhetoric. For a while when it looked as if there was a reasonable probability that a deal might be done, it was clearly going to be at the expense of policy space in agriculture. India's farmers, the G-33 and developing countries -- with a defensive interest in agriculture -- must have heaved a huge sigh of relief.
Policy space: Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms
At the heart of addressing livelihood concerns of small farmers in developing countries in the on-going Doha round of WTO negotiations is the designation of Special Products (SPs) and Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) in the Agreement on Agriculture.
Developing countries have argued that SPs -- products linked to food security and livelihood security -- should either be subject to no tariffs or small reductions. An SSM would allow a temporary increase of relevant tariffs in response to a pre-specified increase in import volumes or decline in price levels.
In designing the use of both these instruments, the G33 and other developing country groupings in the WTO have sought to amplify the policy space available to developing countries in dealing with livelihood concerns while continuing to integrate into the global economy.
The reason for framing livelihood issues in this manner is the understanding that small and marginal farmers, at least in most developing countries -- including India -- lead an exceedingly precarious economic existence and are not positioned to compete effectively in relatively open agricultural markets, particularly given the levels of subsidies enjoyed by agricultural producers in developed countries.
Therefore, in a situation where reasonable opportunities of migrating out of agriculture are limited even in rapidly growing economies, forcing farmers off their land through import competition is both economically and politically unsustainable.
Second, given the above, the flexibilities sought in the use of instruments have to be put in the context of the seriously limited policy space currently available to developing countries in helping small and marginal farmers cope with import competition, given that direct production subsidies of various sorts are WTO-illegal.
Negotiations around policy space
Crawford Falconer's initial negotiating text for the Agreement on Agriculture made a mockery of livelihood concerns of small farmers that is at the heart of the developing country and Indian position. It offered that the SSM be activated if prices decline by 30 per cent or more and far fewer SPs than the G33 have asked for.
Little wonder then that India had said that the new text is 'totally unacceptable.' Perhaps, much more pointedly, the Small and Vulnerable Economies Group, commenting on Falconer's draft text noted, among other things that as far as the SSM is concerned, "lamentably the text is very far from reflecting a possible agreement, because the dispositions contained therein turn it into a mechanism without utility for the developing countries." (Translation mine)
After extensive consultations with WTO member countries and official


