The well-fought defensive battles in Aksai Chin and eastern Arunachal, in remote and forbidding locations such as Galwan, Rezang La, Gurung Hill and Walong, effectively halted Chinese advances not once but twice during the campaign. These engagements, fought with grit and without adequate support, were not immediately known to the world in 1962, points out Dr Kumar.
India emerged from the war militarily bruised and strategically altered. The United States, under the guise of friendship, had succeeded in achieving what open alignment never could: The psychological and political repositioning of India within the Cold War order, points out Dr Kumar.
What appeared to be a generous act of friendship was, in truth, a manoeuvre within a much larger strategic game. The United States used the 1962 war not just to aid India but to test how far it could be pulled into the Western fold, points out Dr Kumar.
As India and China continue to face off across the Himalayas six decades later, the echoes of that earlier conflict remain unmistakable. The core of China's sensitivity lies not in maps or mountain passes, but in its perception of sovereignty over Tibet, points out Dr Kumar.
The MiG-21 episode demonstrates that procurement is always strategic.
Choices about what aircraft to acquire, who builds them, who supplies the spares, who trains the pilots and technicians are decisions with political consequences lasting for decades.