India, France and Israel were unlikely to proliferate as a matter of national policy but was 'susceptible' to the lure of economic and political advantages to be gained from exporting nuclear arms-related materials and technology, a just-declassified US intelligence report, that came after the 1974 Pokhran tests, had said.
In the wake of the Indian nuclear tests on May 17, 1974 and growing concern about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, the US intelligence community prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate titled 'Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', a document that was released on Tuesday by the National Security Archive.
Though the introductory note said that the paper includes 'discussions of Indian nuclear intentions,' the NSA has pointed out that 'when it reviewed the 1974 SNIE for the most recent release, the CIA heavily excised the discussion of the Indian nuclear programme.'
The SNIE had estimated that 'many countries' will have the economic and technological capability to produce atomic weapons, believed that Israel has already produced nuclear arms and expressed apprehension that terrorists might attempt theft of either weapons or fissionable materials.
"France, India and Israel, while unlikely to proliferate as a matter of national policy will prove susceptible to the lure of economic and political advantages to be gained from exporting materials, technology and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons programmes. And most proliferators are on good terms with one or all others," the SNIE had said.
"The 1974 Indian test created shock waves in the US government, not only because of its broader implications, but because the intelligence community had failed to detect that it was imminent," the NSA said in its release.
"The possibility that the Indian test might lead to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and create new pressures for nuclear proliferation elsewhere induced the US government, which under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had treated this problem as a lower-level issue, to begin viewing developing policies to curb proliferation as a higher priority," it said.
The SNIE estimated that 'many countries' will have the economic and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons by the 1980s underlined the seriousness of the problem, as did another statement: 'terrorists might attempt theft of either weapons or fissionable materials.'
The heavily excised document noted that there were over 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world and said that the 'absolute assurance about future security is impossible.'
The CIA released the 1974 SNIE in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by National Security Archive senior fellow Jeffrey Richelson.
The heavily-excised document of the CIA had said even as early as 1974 that terrorists might attempt theft of either weapons or fissionable materials.
"They could see the latter as useful for terror or blackmail purposes even if they had no intention of going on to fabricate weapons," the CIA said.
The nodal intelligence agency had come to the conclusion that Israel had already 'produced and stockpiled a small number of fission weapons' and that in Taiwan 'facilities are being developed with conscious intent to keep a nuclear weapon option open.'
