'This tragedy will not be the last -- you shall witness another tomorrow, perhaps another the day after, and increasingly more.'
On October 24, 2025, a catastrophic bus fire on National Highway 44 near Chinna Tekur village in Kurnool district, Andhra Pradesh, claimed at least 20 lives when a V Kaveri Travels sleeper coach from Hyderabad to Bengaluru collided with a motorcycle and erupted in flames around 3.30 am.
The bus, carrying 44 passengers, became a death trap as the emergency doors jammed due to a short circuit and theinflammable interiors accelerated the inferno within minutes.
In this two-part interview with Prasanna D Zore/Rediff, Bhaskar Rao, former commissioner of police, Bengaluru, and former transport commissioner of Karnataka, delivers a withering critique of India's road safety infrastructure.
"It was not merely an accident; it was a set of circumstances waiting to happen," he states unequivocally.
From cargo-laden passenger buses and electronically operated emergency exits that jam during accidents to expired fire extinguishers and fuel tanks positioned on the wrong side, Mr. Rao systematically exposes layers of systemic negligence.
Could the Kurnool bus tragedy have been avoided?
Every accident can be avoided. That is precisely why we term it an accident -- normal operations are interrupted by something abnormal, resulting in tragic consequences.
This incident could definitively have been prevented, because numerous systems that ought to have been in place were conspicuously absent, and various administrative measures that should have been enforced were never implemented.
What specific safety measures were not enforced? What should have been done to prevent this accident?
Let us begin with the most fundamental issue: This vehicle is a bus, not a cargo truck. How can cargo be transported in a passenger bus?
There were 200 mobile phones being carried -- and that represents merely one category of goods. Why is cargo permitted in buses when we have dedicated cargo services, lorries, and parcel vans for such purposes?
There exists no restriction on the types of goods being transported in passenger vehicles. This constitutes the first systemic failure.
Secondly, consider the emergency exits. Throughout my tenure as transport commissioner, I identified the critical importance of rooftop emergency doors.
Initially, these buses had such doors with hammers placed on the left and right sides. Only through my insistence did operators begin installing hammers at all windows.
However, our citizenry exhibited a peculiar tendency to pilfer these hammers. Nevertheless, it remains an international norm to maintain safety exits and emergency equipment.
You've mentioned international standards. How do our buses compare?
Bus transport is exceedingly safe in Western countries because bus accidents are remarkably rare there. Now, examine the design of our buses. The fuel tank is positioned on the right side. These buses are predominantly manufactured for left-hand drive countries, where vehicles travel on the right side of the road, thereby isolating the fuel tank from traffic.
In India, however, where we drive on the left, the fuel tank remains on the right side -- completely exposed to oncoming traffic.
In the event of any collision on the right side, the fuel tank absorbs the initial impact, and the fuel contents accelerate the fire. The fuel tank should logically be positioned on the left side in our context, as that represents our isolated side.
What other design flaws have you identified?
The emergency doors present another critical concern. During my tenure as transport commissioner, I visited the Volvo factory and requested that a gentleman in his mid-30s, dressed in a suit, demonstrate jumping from the emergency door. He exhibited considerable hesitation to jump during daylight with visible ground beneath him.
I posed this question: If he hesitated under ideal conditions, how could we expect younger passengers, women, children, or senior citizens to break the door and jump from a height of 13 feet during an emergency, particularly when others are rushing from behind?
Moreover, these emergency doors operate electronically. When the electronic system fails -- as it invariably does during accidents -- the doors fail to open.
The driver in this incident reported attempting to unlock the doors, but they remained jammed. The only recourse is to break the glass, but these are toughened glasses that do not shatter easily, and the hammers are typically missing.
At that juncture, I refused to register KSRTC (\Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation) buses unless they installed proper emergency doors. I also mandated seat belts, as these buses travel at speeds of 90 to 110 kilometres per hour.
Whilst emergency doors were eventually installed, they painted over them. I insisted that during daily cleaning operations, emergency doors should be opened and closed as part of the drill.
I also requested Volvo to produce instructional videos -- similar to aircraft safety demonstrations -- explaining the location of emergency exits in multiple languages. Unfortunately, these measures were subsequently discontinued.
What about other safety equipment?
There is typically one first-aid box, invariably outdated, positioned near the driver at the front. The driver is expected to retrieve it whilst managing the emergency.
Additionally, there is one fire extinguisher that has not been serviced for 10 to 12 years, kept somewhere beneath the seats long after its expiry date.
No fire extinguisher is maintained inside the passenger cabin.
Another disturbing trend: Operators wish to make their buses aesthetically appealing and 'romantic,' installing inflammable curtains, carpets, and fixtures throughout. These fixtures -- magazine holders and similar accessories -- can cause injuries to passengers during collisions.
I am profoundly critical of ARAI, the Automotive Research Association of India in Pune, which homologates vehicles. Why have they failed to consider passenger safety aspects? They should issue regular advisories to state road transport departments regarding annual fitness test protocols.
With electric buses now entering service, motor vehicle inspectors possess absolutely no knowledge of how to conduct fitness tests for such vehicles. While they remain the competent authority, they are not the qualified authority.
You also mentioned issues with driver standards.
Observe that drivers do not wear uniforms. When one wears a uniform, a certain discipline follows. This is not enforced. These represent the immediate causes.
What about the road engineering aspect?
Consider the toll road design. How can two-wheelers be permitted on these roads? Two-wheelers should be restricted to service roads.
Everyone lauds Minister (of road transport and highways) Nitin Gadkari for constructing beautiful roads, but these roads have become death traps.
If you construct a road where buses travel at 100 to 120 kilometres per hour -- imagine the kinetic forces generated by such massive vehicles at 120 kilometres per hour -- it must be a no-access highway.
Instead, we have highly accessible highways with numerous breaches in the dividers, left unattended. These factors compound one another, creating cascading problems.
Furthermore, anyone can consume liquor, operate a two-wheeler, enter the highway, strike a divider, and obstruct the entire carriageway.
The toll agency should monitor this through CCTV cameras, as I have consistently advocated, but this is not enforced despite charging substantial toll fees.
Information provision to drivers is woefully inadequate. Unanticipated speed breakers and median breaks should be communicated to drivers well in advance. The discipline required for such measures has never been enforced by any government or department.
This represents a recipe for disaster. This tragedy will not be the last -- you shall witness another tomorrow, perhaps another the day after, and increasingly more.
Do you anticipate convictions in this case?
Mark my words: There will be no convictions. In all previous cases, these incidents are treated under Section 304A.
Whom shall we blame?
The deceased motorcyclist?
The bus driver who failed to notice the motorcycle on the carriageway?
The highway should not be strewn with unattended motorcycles. Or shall we blame the toll operator for permitting a motorcycle on the expressway?
It represents a combination of errors. Authorities conduct some perfunctory checks for five to ten days, but this constitutes no solution whatsoever.
As a practitioner of road safety education, what is your assessment of the broader situation?
I must confess to a profound failure on this count. Every single day, 474 people perish in road accidents in India. Every day.
Between the commencement and conclusion of our conversation, someone will have died in a road accident somewhere. Given this tragic reality, none less than the prime minister's office should take cognisance of deaths on our roads.
Toll roads must be no-access roads. There exists a plethora of measures to be implemented. A brief telephone conversation cannot encompass all the answers to your questions.
Why do luxury and private buses continue to pass fitness tests despite lacking basic passenger safety features like fire-retardant materials?
I am rather surprised by the innocence of your question. They pay substantial bribes, my dear colleague. They pay considerable sums and ensure that everything is approved.
Influential persons -- dormant partners, MLAs, or others -- facilitate this. Even a rare motor vehicle inspector who attempts to perform his duty conscientiously is immediately silenced.
Therefore, the responsibility ultimately rests with the chief minister. Life must be treated as precious by the chief minister through superior policies.