Commentary/Amberish K Diwanji

The lessons India must learn from the UN defeat

India's bid to win a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council came a cropper against the economical might of Japan, backed by the United States. While many expected India to lose, what must have come as a shock was the margin of defeat: 141 votes to 40, with three abstentions. India could only garner less than two sevenths of the votes picked up by Japan.

More than anything, this should force India to be realistic about its chances to find a permanent seat in the Security Council, given the fact that the competitors will include financial giants Germany and Japan.

India's defeat will also hopefully awaken Indian officials, who live in their own make-believe world of India as a superpower in the making, to the reality about Indian power. Indian hawks, and there are many of them in influential circles, never shy from pointing out India's might in terms of military power. With the world's second largest army, and an air force and navy among the top 10, no doubt India does appear powerful on paper. Yet, as Paul Kennedy points outs so perceptively in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: An Economic Military History from 1500 to 2000, military strength is only one factor of a country's economic prowess. It is time we in India realise this and stop day dreaming.

The truth about military budgets is that Japan's military budget is higher than India's. Even though Japan puts aside only 1% of its GDP for defence, that 1% makes it today the world's third largest military outlay, after the US and Russia, and more than China, and certainly much, much more than India. In fact, budget-wise, India does not even figure in the top 10. Japan does not possess nuclear weapons today, but would not find it difficult to manufacture them should the need arise (such as a threat from North Korea or China). And technologically, few will doubt that Japanese equipment, military and civilian, are the most advanced in the world.

On the other hand, the ongoing resource crunch has forced India to reduce its military budget down to 2.5% of its GDP. This means that in real terms, the money available has actually come down over the past five years, because our economy has not increased to make 2.5% a large amount. And what is worse, most of India's defence expenses goes in the soft areas: pensions, salaries, administrative matters. Defence purchases and military exercises have been curtailed down to the bare minimum, simply because there is no cash.

The Indian armed forces have vast personnel, and these, instead of being a source of strength, are actually a drain on the economy. Plans are afoot to make the armed forces lean and mean, but these will take time. Technologically, we cannot afford the best, and remain dependent on Russia. Our own efforts at indigenous arms -- the main battle tank, the light combat aircraft, and an aircraft carrier -- remain stalled.

More important is the role of our economy. There is no denying that Japan's economic clout carried the day. It is very difficult not to vote for the country on whom you depend for aid and investment. As a matter of fact, even India seeks Japanese aid. In a world growing closer due to integrating markets and globalising finance, countries hungry for investment will find it difficult to turn down a Japanese request. This point must be borne in mind when the fight for a permanent seat begins.

Middle-class Indians, for whom making India a superpower, and being a permanent member of the Security Council is one manifestation of that, love to point out that as per the IMF list of economies in terms of purchasing power, India is the fifth largest (after the US, Japan, China, and Germany). For them, this means that India is a great power.

What they forget is that weapons are purchased in dollars, even from Russia. In dollar terms, the Indian economy is nowhere near the top ten, and India's share of global trade is less than 1%.

One of India's constant war cry is the role that India has played in UN operations over the years, its uncrowned position as the leader of the Third World, its role in disarmament. To be fair, after World War II, there was no way Japan and Germany could have sent their troops overseas, even under the UN flag, without raising the hackles of other nations. As recently as 1993, when Japanese troops were sent to Cambodia, there was a brouhaha. One can imagine what would have happened if such soldiers had been sent in the 1960s.

No doubt, India's role has earned it high marks in the international fora, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. This was specially so as India carried a moral value in its dealing and refused to lean on either the US or the Soviet Union, giving it a larger than life image on the world stage.

Yet, after India was forced to get close to the then Soviet Union in the early 1970s, its role as non-aligned was compromised, and forever tainted. Even in 1980, when the whole world condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India did not, further reinforcing its image as a Soviet stooge.

India's role in disarmament is now under scrutiny, given its refusal to sign the NPT and the CTBT, especially the latter. It sounds principled to refuse to sign until the nuclear powers give a commitment to disarm, but it can also be seen as aspiring to nuclear status at a time when the world is trying to get away from them. And the Third World today needs investment and aid. It is these very factors that will make Third World countries back Japan or Germany, especially if they are further supported by the US. India's leadership of the Third World is of little avail if it really cannot help the poor countries improve their economies.

Officials at the ministry of external affairs claim that India was defeated because of its stand on the CTBT, and the US ire at it which made it oppose India. This is nonsense. Between India and Japan, the US will almost always support Japan, even if India had signed the CTBT, so let us not whine. The CTBT must hardly have bothered the voting countries. After all, even Australia, which finally helped pass the CTBT, lost in its bid for a seat. The difference was purely economic might. Backing Japan gives countries hope for investment and aid; what will backing India get them? This is a question that Indian must answer.

It is time to take stock of our assets and strengths. It would be most embarrassing to seek permanent membership of the UN if we can't even get 50 votes. And a permanent seat without the power of veto is most useless, giving responsibility without authority. India already knows that the US will not back India; and the West (including Japan) will not be easy to defeat. So are we really prepared for the long-drawn battle? Do we have the resources and moral strength to ensure a decent competition? This is what our officials have to think over before jumping into the fray where defeat is imminent.