Bangladesh-China and Bangladesh-US relations have evolved from reluctant engagement to increasingly consequential strategic partnerships.

Key Points
- Bangladesh faces growing pressure to balance strategic ties with China and the United States while managing relations with India.
- Tarique Rahman's likely absence from the BRICS Outreach session has raised questions over Dhaka's evolving foreign policy direction.
- China's expanding footprint includes major projects around Mongla port and a proposed economic zone in Chattogram.
- Washington can offer Bangladesh financing, economic assistance and Western market access as China expands its regional influence.
- Dhaka's challenge is preserving strategic autonomy while economic vulnerabilities increasingly shape its foreign policy choices.
Now that it appears increasingly clear that Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman will not travel to India for the BRICS Outreach session, a larger question looms: Where does Dhaka go from here in its foreign policy, particularly in its relations with China and the United States?
Is Rahman genuinely caught between the devil and the deep sea or is it a foreign policy doctrine crafted by Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman and Advisor to the prime minister Humayun Kobir?
It is learnt that Rahman personally had no fundamental objection to reaching out to India in Bangladesh's national interest.
But whispers in Dhaka's corridors of power that he was likely to visit India is learnt to have triggered a backlash among a powerful section of domestic opinion, particularly the fundamentalists, who promptly brought the Sheikh Hasina extradition issue back into the political discourse.
In India, too, opinion among Bangladesh watchers is sharply divided. Some believe Rahman is caught in a 'nutcracker', and that Dhaka's attempt to balance China and the US could ultimately leave it 'falling between two stools'.
Others believe pragmatism will prevail and that Bangladesh cannot afford to turn its back on India -- a neighbour that has repeatedly acted as its first responder in times of crises. Besides, every action has a shelf life, so "how long can they play the Sheikh Hasina card?"
There is, however, another school of thought: Bangladesh may be able to sail through, at least for now, having found a workable balance in its engagement with China and the United States.
The immediate trigger for much of the uncertainty is not merely Rahman's absence from the BRICS Outreach session.
It is the broader question of how much room Dhaka has to manoeuvre at a time when its domestic politics, economic vulnerabilities and external partnerships are pulling it in different directions.
There are also intellectuals and Bangladesh observers who believe Sheikh Hasina's announcement, made at a virtual press conference in Delhi on August 5, that she intends to return home voluntarily in December was politically unhelpful.
Indeed, after learning of Hasina's announcement, several of these observers told this correspondent that India was unlikely to quickly recapture the warmth it shared with Bangladesh until only a few years ago.
Their assessment was that bilateral ties would remain on a slow track for some time -- and that the long-pending BIMSTEC meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit was also unlikely to materialise.

Why India Wants Bangladesh Back At Table
India, meanwhile, has its own political and strategic reasons for wanting Bangladesh at the table.
"India has strategic and political interests to bring Bangladesh to participate in mid-September. Clearly India does not want Bangladesh to be completely under the influence of China and Pakistani hands," a retired diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said.
For New Delhi, therefore, this is not simply about one summit or one diplomatic appearance. It is about India's stake in the larger strategic balance in South Asia.
The hint of emphasis was in Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi's diplomatically chosen wordings when he termed the relationship between India and Bangladesh a 'partnership of equals'.
Therefore, despite its 'frustrations' with Dhaka, India continued to provide assistance where Bangladesh has needed it most.
Apart from its refusal to hand over former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, New Delhi has sought to keep channels open and help meet Bangladesh's immediate requirements -- from power and fuel supplies to the issuance of medical visas, etc.
That approach reflects more than diplomatic calculation. Bangladesh is one of India's closest neighbours, bound to it by deep socio-cultural, linguistic and economic ties, as well as a shared history and geography.
The two countries share a 4,096-kilometre border, making it one of the longest international borders in the world.
Bangladesh's geographical proximity to India's north eastern states adds another layer of strategic significance.
But Bangladesh in itself is passing through a period of acute vulnerability. Its economic difficulties are severe, while the growing influence of fundamentalist forces has complicated the political landscape.
A country once identified strongly with agriculture is today heavily dependent on imports for basic agricultural and food requirements, ranging from sugar and oilseeds to foodgrains and urea.
This vulnerability has created an opening for China.
"China is using Bangladesh as a golden opportunity as they did with Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. The intention stems purely from their own strategic interest; it wants to have a strategic foothold and then expand," the diplomat said.
"Also, in good times Bangladesh can become their reasonably stable economic partner -- Bangladesh can import Chinese goods," the diplomat added.

China's expanding economic and strategic footprint is increasingly visible. The recent agreement on the development of an economic zone near Mongla port is a case in point.
The project was originally earmarked for an Indian economic zone but was delisted during the Muhammad Yunus-led interim administration, when relations between Dhaka and New Delhi deteriorated.
Following Rahman's visit to Beijing, a joint statement issued stated the two sides had agreed to 'jointly advance the Mongla Port Facilities Modernization and Expansion Project' as well as the development of the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram.
China's Mongla Move Raises India Concerns
The 110-acre economic zone is strategically important for India. Mongla is Bangladesh's second-largest and second-busiest seaport after Chattogram.
It is located less than 200 kilometres from Kolkata and close to the Sundarbans, the port obviously holds strategic and commercial significance.
The Bangladesh Economic Zones Authority has signed a memorandum of understanding with China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation for the project.
Then there is the Teesta river project -- another sensitive issue for India because of the river's proximity to the India-Bangladesh border and its implications for India's north eastern states.
China is moving quickly. The question, therefore, is whether Washington can afford to remain on the sidelines.
The US is unlikely to match China project-for-project in infrastructure development. But it can offer Bangladesh something else: financing, economic assistance and access to Western markets.
If Washington decides that maintaining influence in Bangladesh is strategically important, financial support in the form of development assistance and project financing could become an increasingly important instrument of engagement.
In fact, Washington is giving emphasis to further engage with Dhaka for its own regional interest. On August 30, US Ambassador to India and South Central Asia envoy Sergio Gor announced on X that Bangladesh will purchase more US planes.
He posted, '...Just this week, President Trump and the Prime Minister of Bangladesh made another incredible Deal, with Bangladesh committing to spend billions of dollars to buy more Boeing aircraft, significantly increasing their initial order. ...'
Pointing to the trajectory of the relationship between Bangladesh and the US in recent years, Professor Sreeradha Datta of the O P Jindal Global University, Sonipat, says: "The relationship has been on the rise since Mohammad Yunus came and I don't see that changing in the months to come."
She is not particularly concerned that Rahman's non-participation will damage Bangladesh-China ties.
"China does not really care," Datta said, emphasising that Bangladesh and China already have an established bilateral relationship.
"They (China) would know why Bangladesh is not participating and that will not allow it to cast any shadow on their bilateral relationship."
Dhaka's Balancing Act Faces Test
Professor Datta's assessment is unequivocal: "Bangladesh has found the right balance to engage with China and the USA." She further adds, "China and the USA want to deepen their stake in the region and why would Bangladesh not leverage that?"
However, former Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty takes a more cautious view. He believes Rahman's absence will not be welcomed by either China or Russia.
"I do not think China or Russia will be pleased with Bangladesh's refusal to attend the event," he said.
As for Washington, Chakravarty believes the US is unlikely to object as long as Bangladesh remains politically innocuous.
The US has also threatened sanctions against BRICS countries if they adopt policies aimed at bypassing the dollar.
"Bangladesh is keen to join the Mecca Pact. It is trying for a balance but may fall between different stools," Chakravarty said.
That may ultimately be the central dilemma for Dhaka.

Bangladesh-China and Bangladesh-US relations have evolved from reluctant engagement to increasingly consequential strategic partnerships.
Both Beijing and Washington see Bangladesh through the prism of their own larger geopolitical objectives.
India, meanwhile, cannot afford to watch passively as a strategically vital neighbour moves deeper into the orbit of competing powers.
For Rahman, the challenge is not just choosing between India, China and the US. It is also ensuring that Bangladesh does not become a pawn in the contest among them.
That requires economic pragmatism, diplomatic agility and, above all, an unambiguous understanding of Bangladesh's own national interest.
The temptation of external partnerships can be seductive. But strategic autonomy becomes difficult to preserve when economic vulnerability begins dictating foreign policy.
The grass may indeed look greener on the other side. For Bangladesh, the real question is whether it can afford to keep looking over the fence -- or whether it needs to cultivate its own ground first.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff




