Does China have what it takes to be a superpower?

Here, he analyses if China has what it takes to be recognised as a true superpower in the modern world.

Sixty years after Mao Zedong proclaimed the birth of the People's Republic of China from Tiananmen Square, China has become a power to reckon with. No doubt about it.

That was General Chi Haotian, former Chinese defence minister and vice-chairman of China's all-powerful Central Military Commission. Can you imagine any other defence minister in the world speaking such a language? He is not alone in China.

For the past 60 years, the People's Republic of China has failed to introduce a modern system of governance. Though the word 'people's' is recurrent in all State institutions in China, since 1949, a single party runs the nation. Ordinary people have no say in state affairs.

Laws or rights, which are acknowledged as universal by world bodies, remain unimplemented by the leaders in Zhongnanhai. Beijing pretends that they are irrelevant to modern China as being a Western invention.

But democracy is not a concept confined to the West. Is President Hu Jintao aware that democracy (from the Greek demokratia, 'power to the people') existed in Asia and particularly in India, long before it was introduced in Greece?

National People's Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo has, however, recently declared that China will 'never go down the devious path' of 'Western institutions'. Whether Beijing agrees to it or not, human rights, basic personal laws or universal suffrage are today values accepted by all non-rogue nations.

The Chinese economy faces a similar problem. It remains controlled by the Communist party: There are 150 party-run monopolies in sectors as diverse as petroleum, steel, banking or telecommunications in China today.

Beijing may open 350 Confucius Institutes the world over, but which type of culture or civilisational values does Beijing pretend to 'export'?

Li Xiguang, a scholar at Tsinghua University, pointed out China's difficulties in marketing its 'values': 'The soft power of a country manifests itself in whether it has the power to define and interpret 'universal values' like democracy, freedom and human rights we must let the whole world hear the stories that Chinese citizens have to tell about their democracy, liberty, human rights and rule of law.'

The lawyers point out 'major errors in government policy' after the March April 2008 protests. One was encouragement of racist sentiment towards Tibetans: 'The excessive response of the government all over Tibet was to regard every tree and blade of grass as a potential enemy soldier.'

According to them, this further strained the relations between the local Tibetans and the Han migrants.

One of their conclusions is: 'Understanding is a precondition for discussion, unity and development. There must be a change in thinking and an adjustment in thinking behind the current nationality theories and policies.'

The report found that in Tibet, the difficult terrain has created 'locally fixed power networks, which inevitably led to a high incidence of corruption and dereliction of duty "Foreign forces" and "Tibet independence" are used by many local officials as fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in governance and to repress social discontent.'

The final conclusions are not far from the Tibetan Diaspora's views: 'Earnestly listen to the voices of ordinary Tibetans and on the basis of respecting and protecting each of the Tibetan people's rights and interests'.

Sixty after its foundation, it appears that the People's Republic of China is pulled towards an ever greater authoritarian way of functioning.

Take the post economic crisis situation: With the huge expenditures to be incurred on infrastructure, the state enterprises only will benefit, thereby reinforcing the party and in particular the Politburo Standing Committee.

The People's Liberation Army's role is also constantly reinforced (allowing people like General Chi Haotian to get away with his declarations). Today, the PLA plays a role not only in China's external defence, but has become indispensable to suppress some 100,000 protests, riots and unrest which occurred annually in the mainland due to environmental issues, corruption or unemployment problems. This does not take into account the restive situation in Tibet or Xinjiang.

Willy Lam in his paper on 'quasi-superpower diplomacy' has remarked: 'The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) leadership's refusal to give up Maoist norms like the 'party's absolute leadership over the armed forces' has dented the global appeal of the China model -- and detracted from the viability of Beijing's quasi-superpower diplomacy.'

China is rich. Several Chinese State corporations are on a 'going out' scheme to buy strategic assets the world over. It is not too difficult in Africa or Latin America where bribing a few political leaders helps, but it is less easy when it comes to Western multinationals.

These mergers and acquisitions have usually been related to oil and other raw materials. Chinese moves are watched by a trembling West. Is a return of the Yellow peril being witnessed?

Petrochina, Sinopec and CNOOC, China's oil monopolies have already been involved in overseas mergers and acquisitions worth $12 billion (about Rs 60,000 crore) in the first half of 2009 (80 percent more than during the same period in 2008).

China's Aluminum Corporation (Chinalco) tried recently to acquire 18 percent (worth $19.5 billion or about Rs 97,500 crore) of the British-Australian mining corporation Rio Tinto. Shivers were felt around the world. If Beijing had succeeded, China would have had to access to most of the iron-ore and copper mines in Australia.