'You cannot 'clear' your way to peace.'
'You need intelligence, calibrated force, impartial law enforcement, political neutrality, humanitarian returns and a sustained reconciliation plan.'
"The Centre must ensure investigations are demonstrably independent and that any political patronage allegations are pursued transparently; an impartial inquiry (judicial/CBI level) for high-profile incidents can restore trust," says Lieutenant General Shokin Chauhan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM and former Director General Assam Rifles.
The Assam Rifles is responsible for counter insurgency, border security and maintaining law and order in the North East.
General Chauhan was chairman of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group to ensure peace in the North East after retirement from the Indian Army in 2018. He has vast experience in conducting counter terrorist operations both in Kashmir and the North East.
In the concluding part of his interview with Rediff's Archana Masih, the general discusses the challenges posed by the emergence of new insurgent groups and measures that will bring peace to Manipur.
Has the conflict in Manipur revived old banned outfits and reactivated cadres?
There is credible reporting of arrests and renewed activity among several small outfits and splinter groups (UKNA, Chin-Kuki-Mizo elements, PLA operations and arrests of commanders).
Arrests of militant figures in recent operations indicate that active cadres remain and new groups or previously dormant elements are resurfacing.
How does this complicate the situation?
Fragmentation: More small groups mean there is no single interlocutor for negotiations; multiple spoilers can veto any settlement.
Criminal-insurgent hybridisation: Politically motivated insurgency increasingly mixes with organised crime (extortion, trafficking), making purely military solutions ineffective.
Revenge cycles: Reactivation of cadres sustains the cycle of tit-for-tat attacks, complicates reconciliation and increases civilian suffering.
What is the solution to the festering conflict between the communities and various insurgent groups?
Practical, prioritised solutions (operational + political + social) are required.
Short version: Stabilise security using intelligence-led, surgical operations; remove political patronage and restore neutral rule-of-law; urgently open credible political channels and local confidence building; accelerate humanitarian returns and economic stabilisation; and create a long-term reconciliation process.
Below I set these out in action-priority order.
Immediate (0-6 weeks) -- Stabilisation and Law Enforcement
1. Create an Office for a Chairman of Monitoring Cell: This should deal equally with both the security forces and the insurgent groups. This office should have legitimacy, should be seen as neutral and acceptable. (Very Important)
2. Consolidate intelligence fusion: Create a single joint fusion cell (IB, R&AW inputs, state police, Army/Assam Rifles, local magistracy liaisons) focused on:
a. Identifying instigators of recent provocations;
b. Mapping arms caches and arms-trafficking nodes;
c. Following financial trails for suspected contract actions.
Prioritise digital forensics (call records, payments). (Operational lead: security agencies/CISF/IB).
3. Targeted, lawful kinetic actions on verified intelligence: Avoid wide, indiscriminate operations that alienate communities; use surgical arrests, weapons seizures and quick, transparent prosecutions to demonstrate rule of law.
Publicly publish redacted evidence of major actions to reduce rumours.
4. Remove any credible political protection: The Centre must ensure investigations are demonstrably independent and that any political patronage allegations are pursued transparently; an impartial inquiry (judicial/CBI level) for high-profile incidents can restore trust.
Short to medium term (6 weeks-6 months) -- Governance, Humanitarian and Policing fixes
5. Restore neutral civil administration and policing credibility: Rotate or reconstitute local police leadership where partisan perception exists; increase presence of non-local, community-engaged policing units trained in ethnic conflict de-escalation. Empower local magistrates to process fast-track justice for high-visibility crimes.
6. Reassess buffer zones with a goal to rationalise them: Buffer arrangements should be temporary, monitored by neutral agencies (e.g., central civil administration + independent observers) and linked to time-bound confidence measures (return of IDPs [intrusion detection and prevention], community patrols with mixed membership). Long-term segregation institutionalises grievance.
7. Humanitarian push for safe returns and livelihoods: Rapid, well-publicised relief, reconstruction of destroyed houses/places of worship, compensation and livelihood packages reduce recruitment pools for militants. Ensure third-party monitoring (NGOs, credible civil society) to verify fairness.
Medium to long term (6 months - years) -- political settlement & reconciliation
8. Political dialogue with credible local stakeholders: Create structured, mediated talks that include civil society, traditional leaders, moderate party representatives, and neutral central mediators. Avoid empowering spoilers and extremists -- make inclusion conditional on renunciation of violence.
9. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for rank-and-file: Offer credible, verifiable reintegration packages for low-level fighters, with monitoring and vocational support; couple with prosecutions for leaders responsible for major crimes. Military and policing units should have a role in vetting and security guarantees.
10. Institutional reforms to policing and development: Invest in long-term police reform, community policing, improved forensic and digital investigation capacity; push targeted economic development in contested districts (jobs, infrastructure) to reduce the incentive to join militias.
11. Cut external sanctuaries and trafficking: Work bilaterally and regionally to stop cross-border flow of weapons and fighters. Intelligence cooperation with neighbours and targeted interdiction of smugglers is essential.
Legal and accountability measures (cross-cutting)
Communication/information operations
What are the operational red flags to watch closely in terms of intelligence indicators?
If these appear, escalate to a national-level contingency posture and prioritise disruption of sponsor networks.
The peace is fragile and remains vulnerable to provocations intended to create political crisis; investigators are right to treat the Nambol ambush as possibly politically motivated while continuing classic CT/investigative work.
1. Solve this as a mixed problem, you cannot 'clear' your way to peace. You need intelligence, calibrated force, impartial law enforcement, political neutrality, humanitarian returns and a sustained reconciliation plan.
2. The single most important short term action: An integrated intelligence-to-prosecution chain that can show results publicly (arrests, weapon seizures, court filings) while avoiding heavy-handed mass operations that drive recruitment.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff