'Israel Doesn't Want Pakistan To Have Nuclear Weapons'

'If the Trump administration could gain access to the nuclear weapons, they would be satisfied -- at least they could control them.'

Pakistan's parliament is poised to approve the contentious 27th Constitutional Amendment -- a move that will fundamentally reshape the country's military command structure.

The proposed law seeks to amend Article 243 of Pakistan's constitution to create the powerful office of the chief of defence forces (CDF), replacing the existing chairman, joint chiefs of staff committee.

If enacted, the amendment will consolidate command authority across the army, navy and air force under a single figure -- without doubt Field Marshal Asim Munir as the CDF -- effectively centralising Pakistan's strategic and operational control in one office.

The amendment, which is likely to pass swiftly through Pakistan's senate and national assembly, proposes to extend Munir's tenure from three to five years, and has sparked protests from lawmakers who accuse the Shehbaz Sharif government of bypassing democratic processes.

In the first of a two-part interview with Prasanna D Zore/Rediff, Avinash Mohananey, the retired Intelligence Bureau officer who spent a considerable time in Pakistan on security assignments, provides a candid analysis of the amendment's far-reaching implications, especially for India.

How serious is the internal rift within Pakistan's defence forces today? Do you perceive this as a temporary power struggle or a deeper institutional divide between the three arms of the defence forces?

The amendment which the government is introducing -- the 27th Amendment -- will exacerbate the rift between the three services substantially. The air force and navy are now virtually being brought under the control of the chief of defence forces, a position which presently rests with Asim Munir.

Following his new appointment as chief of defence forces, Munir may likely secure a five-year tenure. Consequently, this domination shall continue for the next half-decade.

Not only are the service chiefs affected, but the nuclear command authority and the strategic command authority have also been brought under the purview of the chief of defence forces. The ceremonial post of chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) has been abolished entirely.

The current CJCSC General Shamshad Mirza retires shortly...

He is retiring on the 27th of this month. With his retirement comes the termination of that post, and this new position shall be created.

The most significant aspect attached to this new post is that any five-star officer carries immunity for the remainder of his or her life. Beyond immunity, the holder will retain this rank, all privileges, and everything attached to this post. He can even wear uniform until his death.

Who are the principal beneficiaries of the 27th Amendment? At whose behest has this been brought forward?

This is largely at the behest of the present army chief (Asim Munir). As the situation deteriorates in Pakistan and as he keeps the country's most popular leader, Imran Khan, in jail, he fears that tomorrow should Imran Khan become prime minister again -- which remains a possibility, given that Nawaz Sharif was imprisoned and subsequently became prime minister -- then Imran Khan might treat him as Nawaz Sharif treated President Musharraf.

Musharraf was compelled to go through the legal process and ultimately died in a faraway land, exiled from Pakistan.

Munir wants to close all those avenues to ensure he receives complete immunity until his death.

So he does not want the prime minister also to come under this umbrella of permanent immunity?

No, he cannot. If he were to grant permanent immunity to incumbent Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, he would be obliged to extend it to Imran Khan as well. That is precisely the fear, and that is the reason why the prime minister's office has not been brought under this provision.

However, the president has been included -- that represents the Pakistan People's Party's bargain. Asif Ali Zardari was imprisoned previously and faces numerous cases, so he could be incarcerated again even if he remains president of Pakistan. Essentially, the PPP, the army, and Shehbaz Sharif have entered into a Faustian bargain for each other's benefit.

How might the 27th Amendment alter the traditional power hierarchy dominated by the Pakistan army? Of course, Asim Munir assuming the role of chief of defence forces would consolidate this further. But is it likely to fundamentally change the traditional power hierarchy?

The power hierarchy has largely remained with the army, except for brief periods -- when Nawaz Sharif was prime minister for a spell, and when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also served as prime minister. During those periods, the army remained backstage and civilian supremacy was somewhat visible. But now it is no longer possible.

Shehbaz Sharif holds the office of prime minister solely because of Asim Munir. Had the army not rigged the February 8, 2024 elections, Shehbaz would not have even won his seat. He lost from both constituencies during the night counting. He was trailing on both seats when suddenly they declared him elected from one. This is precisely army rule with a civilian façade.

Does this move effectively place all strategic and nuclear decision-making under the army's command? What does that signify for Pakistan's command and control systems?

The entire command and control structure will remain in the hands of the Pakistan army. The political input required to manage the State and formulate foreign policy is shrinking considerably. I do not believe that Shehbaz Sharif will have any right even now to dictate what foreign policy Pakistan should pursue.

Everything is being concentrated under one person, and we all understand how the Defence forces of any country maintain a blinkered view of the world, a circumscribed view of domestic issues.

That perspective will be reflected, and it is going to exacerbate the problems that Pakistan is facing internally, as well as in its relationship with neighbours, including India, China and Afghanistan. We are already witnessing this deterioration.

What has changed in recent years to make these divisions within Pakistan's armed forces visible and politically consequential? The army has always been influential, but now it is predominantly deciding which politicians will rule.

This has been the norm in Pakistan since Ayub Khan became army chief and thereafter controlled everything. This pattern has been repeating itself. This is not new to Pakistan.

However, Asim Munir elevated his stature after Operation Sindoor. He raised his level from general to field marshal, and now, by introducing this amendment, perhaps buoyed by the effusive praise he is receiving from Donald Trump, he believes he has become something extraordinarily significant.

Some observers have suggested that the United States is quietly shaping Pakistan's defence policies, favouring certain commanders and strategic directions -- essentially to control Pakistan's nuclear assets and maintain influence over Iran. How credible are these claims, and what could Washington's endgame be?

Washington's endgame remains uncertain -- even President Trump doesn't know. We cannot definitively say they have any grand strategic game involved. However, if you examine past statements by Israeli Prime Minister (Benjamin) Netanyahu, he expressed concern about the nuclear capabilities of both Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan, of course, is an overt nuclear power -- this became evident in 1998.

Israel would not like Pakistan to retain these nuclear weapons. I recall when Pakistan was about to test its nuclear weapons in May 1998 -- I was posted in Islamabad at that time -- they summoned the Indian high commissioner to convey that they had intelligence inputs suggesting India and Israel were jointly planning to attack their nuclear assets.

That was soon after India's nuclear tests?

Yes, in the same month. Pakistan tested, I believe, on May 28, and we had tested on May 13 or May 14. Pakistan feared at that time that India would attack, but these inputs proved entirely false. The (then) American ambassador (to Pakistan) and everyone else denied any such plan existed.

The issue is that Israel does not want Pakistan to continue holding nuclear weapons. If the Trump administration could gain access to the nuclear weapons, they would be satisfied -- at least they could control them.

Not that Pakistan is going to relinquish its nuclear programme under any circumstances -- that will not happen. But at minimum, the fear that these weapons may fall into the wrong hands -- the Americans would attempt to prevent that scenario.

Secondly, Iran would obviously be concerned, as would China, about developments in Pakistan. If Pakistan grants access to critical minerals in Balochistan to American companies, then Balochistan, which shares a long border with Iran, will have Americans moving about throughout the region.

Pakistan has also apparently proposed a port at Pasni in Balochistan to export those critical minerals -- only 100 miles from the Iranian border.

Such a lengthy land border, which is entirely porous, coupled with American presence, would not sit well with Iran or with China.

The moment they dispatched two tonnes of mineral samples to a Minnesota-based company, China implemented export control orders stipulating that its machinery cannot be used for mineral exports.

Currently, Pakistan is using Chinese machinery. China is evidently not pleased with how things are developing in the region.