Creating a powerful new chief of defence forces has split the Pakistan military into four competing factions, points out Rana Banerji, who headed the Pakistan desk at RA&W.
Even as the parliamentary committee of Pakistan's senate and national assembly -- headed jointly by Pakistan Peoples Party Senator Farooq Naik and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) MP Chaudhry Mahmood Bashir Virk -- rushed to approve the 27th amendment to the constitution on Sunday, November 9, evidence surfaced of rising dissent, both from legal circles and within the defence services, against the changes proposed.
The most surprising aspect of the 27th amendment was the emphasis on immunity for life, extended to persons currently in office, including not only Pakistan's president but the army chief.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif scotched an attempt to extend it even to the institution of prime minister.
This revealed unusual insecurity, possibly anticipating a revival of Imran Khan's political fortunes in howsoever distant a future.
An interesting tweet, ascribed to the daily Islamabad Post, alleged, 'the internal rift between the Pakistan army and General Asim Munir had reached a critical point'.
Not carried in its print edition or on its Web site, the tweet suggests 'the ongoing debate over the proposed position of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) is no longer a matter of simple administrative reform but has evolved into a contest of influence, power, and strategic anxiety'.
Apparently, four factions have emerged within the defence forces.
The first faction, supportive of Field Marshal Asim Munir, holds leadership of the unified defence structure is rightful enough, under a strong leader of the army. They argue that a land-experienced chief of defence forces can best synchronise civil-military tasks with the air force and navy's capabilities.
The second faction, reflecting the views of the air force and its supporters, contends that modern warfare is won through technology, air power, drones, and precision strikes, not through large land armies.
They believe the air force represents Pakistan's most advanced and modern defence component and has played a key role in recent conflicts.
From their perspective, they see the army attempting to seize central control of the entire defence establishment even in domains where it lacks technical competence.
A third faction, mostly aligned with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, sees this as an 'administrative or constitutional coup', arguing that the change is unnecessary as 'Pakistan already has the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) to ensure coordination among the three armed services'.
According to this faction, 'this new proposal is not genuine reform but an attempt to centralise authority and grant the army permanent dominance over national security and governance structures'.
A fourth faction warns that if nuclear decision-making and overall military command are concentrated in a single office, Pakistan will become more vulnerable to global pressure from powers like the United States, Britain or even China.
Viewing this recast of Pakistan's military command hierarchy as the most ambitious and perhaps the most contentious restructuring effort in decades, retired Generals like Lieutenant General Asim Yasin Malik, a former DG ISI and defence secretary, believe that the hasty changing of Article 243 could not only disturb the fragile equilibrium between civilian and military power but also collide with entrenched institutional cultures.
Its implementation may prove far more difficult than its drafters imagine. General Malik warned, 'By placing an army officer as the chief of defence forces with authority over the air force and navy, the proposed system invites institutional imbalance and potential disaster', especially as 'this amendment appears tailored to benefit a specific individual'.
For over four decades, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) served as the symbolic head of the armed services, designed to ensure coordination among Pakistan's army, navy and air Force.
In practice, the role remained largely ceremonial, with the army becoming reluctant to rotate it to the air force or navy after 1997.
The proposed amendment seeks to dissolve the post entirely on November 27, 2025, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza.
General Mirza has had a most outstanding career in the army and is highly respected for all round competence by his peer group of senior officers.
Hailing from humble origins in Chakwal, he was senior most in the 76th Pakistan military academy Kakul Long Course and served as Director General Military Operations before promotion to three star rank.
He then served as Chief of General Staff and Corps Commander, X Corps, Rawalpindi under General Qamar Javed Bajwa.
During the tempestuous days of May 2023 there was even a rumour t1hat Imran Khan instigated General Mirza to overthrow Asim Munir while the latter was outside the country. But General Mirza played with a straight bat then.
Lately, General Mirza has been kept busy undertaking several visits abroad, to Singapore for the Shangri La dialogue, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. While these may have been ceremonial visits, retiring in a backdrop where the post would now stand abolished, may not leave a good taste, especially among senior generals aspiring to attain four star rank in the one post available in the face Asim Munir's indefinite extension as army chief.
Several related questions have been raised by academics in Pakistan, as to whether the Joint Staff Committee itself would function afterwards or what would be the protocol or pecking order between civilian politicians and senior defence officials, if and when the National Security Committee is convened.
This criticism cuts to the core of the country's military culture, where undercurrents of deep-seated rivalries among the army, air force and navy have simmered, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine.
Harmonising these distinct traditions -- air power's rapid, decentralised decision cycles versus the army's hierarchical chain of command -- has historically been the Achilles' Heel of earlier efforts at 'joint' reform.
An attempt to reassure discordant chords suggests that the changed model could work best when accompanied by guarantees that the air force and navy would be able to retain control over their core missions, budgets, especially posting, transfers of senior functionaries.
Flushed by glory accompanying his elevation as field marshal after May 2025 it remains to be seen whether Asim Munir would be able to evolve into this type of a benevolent 'primus inter pares leader in days to come.
Feature Presentation: Rajesh Alva/Rediff
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