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Unfulfilled hopes Whither Indian Police?

But where's the ghost?

The Union Cabinet's decision to arm government with the power to extend the services of a Cabinet secretary beyond the age of 60 to 62 has generated some debate. I personally feel that the controversy is based on unjustified fears.

The decision definitely has several merits. Mainly, it invests the high office with a certain stability that has on occasion been elusive. We have otherwise had the ludicrous spectacle of some officers holding the job for less than six months, making a mockery of the administrative process.

Such appointments were based on seniority so as to avoid criticism that this highest civil service job had been denied to the seniormost officer only on the ground that he could not have a reasonable tenure because he was close to retirement. The tyranny of seniority and the consequent predicament of the government could not have been in greater evidence in any other administrative matter.

According to press reports, the government has not opted for an amendment to the fundamental rules that will provide for an automatic two-year term to each Cabinet secretary appointee. There is still some lack of clarity on this point. This is why some observers see a ghost.

I don't. If what the press says is correct, there will no doubt be some subjectivity in the government determining how long they would like a particular officer to stay beyond the age of normal retirement at 60. But it must be remembered that a mandatory term of two years could wipe out a whole batch of officers -- normally the one next to that to which an incumbent belongs -- and cause acute demoralization. The government has to balance the requirement for a reasonable tenure for an appointee with the need to maintain civil service morale.

The present decision possibly takes care of this delicate exercise. My own feeling is that the government will ultimately decree that each Cabinet secretary will be appointed for two years and his services will be extended up to the age of 62 if this is required to complete his tenure.

At the same time, it is generally hoped that all future appointments to this prestigious job will be transparent and based on merit also rather than on mere seniority. This will greatly help to counter the possibly misconceived belief that this office has lost its sheen and importance.

The Cabinet secretary is a faceless bureaucrat who does not go to the press every other day. He is more felt than seen. He plays a crucial role in ensuring civil service effectiveness and integrity. Hence his authority needs to be totally respected so that he implements government policy and acts at the same time as a bulwark against assaults on civil service neutrality.

There is speculation that the new rule of extension beyond 60 will generate a demand for a similar provision in respect of other high offices, especially those in the police. The Administrative Reforms Commission is known to have recommended several years ago a mandatory minimum tenure for several top functionaries. I feel that the Union home secretary, defence secretary and foreign secretary and the heads of the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing will have to be given such a tenure if they are to make more than a token contribution to the administration. Thanks to the Supreme Court, we already have this provision in respect of the CBI chief. We hope that within government thinking will soon crystallize in favour of such a move.

What we should be more concerned about are the happenings in the states. The manner of appointment and the longevity of chief secretaries and DGPs have very often been the subject of animated debate. The record of the southern states has generally been tidy. Respect for merit and seniority has been in some evidence. But the record of the northern states has been appalling, especially in respect of the police chief. I feel that it is the latter, more than the chief secretary who plays an important role in ensuring stability in the society. Also, with the undoubted politicization of the police, it is the DGP who sees that important decisions are not based on crass partisan considerations.

I must refer here to the recommendations of the National Police Commission (1977). In its second report (1979), the commission laid down a detailed procedure for the appointment of the state DGP. According to this, the DGP will be chosen from a panel of three names prepared by a committee comprising the chairman of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), the Union home secretary, the seniormost DGP in the Central Police Organizations, the chief secretary of the state and the serving DGP. The National Police Commission also prescribed a mandatory tenure for the DGP, 'without the Damocles' sword of transfer hanging over his head all the time, subject to political whim'.

Ultimately, all administrative reforms in India should focus themselves on how to make the machinery less partisan and more people-friendly. The former objective cannot be achieved without the civil service leaders themselves standing out for their neutrality and integrity. The proposal for a fixed tenure for the Cabinet secretary, Director CBI and the state DGP aims at this. However, a change in service rules to provide for this cannot by itself enhance the civil service perceptions on non-partisanship. Individuals occupying these positions need enlightenment and will have to be acutely conscious of what is expected of them. Without such awareness, no reform can succeed. And we need such reform badly if international bodies like the World Bank, IMF and ADB are to rate us high.

R K Raghavan