Mistakes in the field prove
costly for India

Daniel Laidlaw

It would be simplistic to conclude that mistakes made in the field are directly responsible for a complete batting breakdown. Many factors combine to produce this disastrous state of affairs. But there is no doubt that being demoralised in the field before going in to bat carries over as a negative influence. That is what happened to India on the second day. While there will rightly be serious questions raised over technique and batting strategy, the initiative lost in the field played a significant part in the Indian collapse that has given Australia an unshakeable grip on the series.

If the batting shambles that is becoming a theme can be overlooked for a while, India may come to realise after the series that it was not the deficiencies of the batsmen that led to them losing control, but an inability to keep the Australians down when they were at the crease.

Australia's relentless bowling attack is its strength. Its batting, while ultimately effective on the scorecard, has been far from a picture of run scoring consistency yet has still managed first innings totals of 349 and 445.

In two Tests now, Australia has added to its list of famed batting escape acts when it was crying out for a killer blow to be delivered. Once the Aussies reach a total that allows them to dictate the match, their world class bowlers are unleashed with thoughts only of taking wickets, rather than having to keep the opposition below a certain score or, perish the thought, contain with defensive lines. When that point arrives, the situation becomes close to untenable for the batting team.

Not that it should be seen as an impossible task or reason sufficient to explain India's collapse. With more application and sense of purpose, McGrath and co. could have been largely kept at bay and the Test conceivably fought out over five days. But really, India was not going to win once Australia reached 445 halfway through the second day. What occurred Monday afternoon was the acceleration of a result that in all likelihood would eventually have been confirmed on the fourth or fifth day anyway. Now we just know it earlier.

It's difficult enough to face McGrath, Gillespie and Warne under any circumstances. When they don't have the pressure of a low total to defend, it becomes overwhelming. Having had Harbhajan Singh seemingly prevent this situation, India should have wrapped up the Aussie innings and confidently begun its own against an attack under pressure. Nothing would have been guaranteed, but it would have been a considerable head start. But thanks to the defensive tactics employed against Steve Waugh, India handed back all of the initiative it had worked so hard to achieve.

Having reduced the tourists to eight down, one would have thought that India would continue to use the tactics that brought those eight wickets, which was Harbhajan Singh bowling attacking off-spin, backed by the pacey Zaheer Khan. But with the Aussies nearly out, India, not the only side to make this mistake, decided to entirely forget about actively trying to dismiss the remaining top order batsman and instead focussed on the tail ender. There are two things wrong with this strategy: It virtually reduces your chances of taking a wicket by 50 per cent, and that batsman India neglected to attack was Steve Waugh.

It is understandable to resort to the method of pushing fielders back to the boundary against a well-set batsman in order to nip out the vulnerable last man. But at the start of the day, with the batsman only on 29 and effectively new at the crease, it serves only to give away runs and play that batsman in.

Admittedly, it should have worked. At 8/301, umpire Bansal turned down an appeal for surely one of the biggest edges to be caught behind ever ruled not out. It proved a crucial error. Despite that, India created no further chances with the same tactics until Australia had reached a record ninth-wicket partnership against India, the highest partnership of the innings, and Jason Gillespie had advanced to his highest Test score.

Also, India picked the wrong pair to use this ploy against. Steve Waugh, known for always putting his faith in the abilities of the lower order batsmen, had no intention of playing keep away with his partner and accepted every run on offer. Stone-faced, he continued to bat normally as if nothing was amiss. Inside, he must secretly have been rejoicing in Ganguly's decision to allow him pressure-free singles.

By not setting fields as if bowling to two top order batsmen, often the best way to dismiss the tail anyway, Ganguly had taken his foot of Australia's throat. And who better to exploit a momentary lowering of defences than the ruthless Waugh?

Nudging singles, taking on the fielders, battling against the second new ball to restore a derailed innings...Waugh was in his element. He couldn't have done it without Gillespie, of course, but no matter who the lower-order batsman is, he always seems to lift when batting with Waugh. Waugh's belief in his ability to hold up an end must lead to the player himself believing it, too. Waugh has been criticised by some for his refusal to shepherd the tail, claiming he selfishly exposes it to boost his own average by remaining not out. But the successes fair outweigh the failures and yet again he was proved right.

In Australia's favour was the fact Gillespie has the ability of a respectable lower order batsman and puts an uncommonly high price on his wicket. He would have a better average if he played his shots, as he spends enough time at the crease to make good scores by tail-end standards, but instead revels in grim defence. In that way, he is similar in style, if not ability, to a defensive top order batsman and should have been bowled to as such. One suspects, though, from the willingness to get him on strike, India was too eager to brush him aside as a minor obstacle, evident in Harbhajan overpitching rather than bowling patiently like he would have to a genuine batsman.

As Waugh brought up his first century in India with uncharacteristic celebration, the message, already known, was made clear and devastatingly reinforced by the end of play: Nothing should be given to Waugh and the Australians, for they will take it all and more.

Adam Gilchrist in Real Audio/Match reports

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