Late President K R Narayanan, who had a strained relationship with the A B Vajpayee government, has come in for criticism from Bharatiya Janata Party leader L K Advani for procedures adopted by him during government formation in 1998 and during its fall a year later.

Along with that, Congress President Sonia Gandhi [Images] also came in for flak for her 'seeds of conspiracy' to destabilise the Vajpayee government and later for the 'big lie' spoken in the premises of Rashtrapati Bhavan [Images] claiming numbers in her favour to form the government.

'The ten-day delay by President Narayanan in inviting Atalji to form the government raised many eyebrows. He had set a new precedent concerning the appointment of prime minister -- namely, if an election to the Lok Sabha produced a hung house with no party or pre-election coalition having a majority, then only that person would be appointed prime minister, who succeeds in convincing the President, through letters of support from allied parties, of his ability to secure the majority,' he writes in his memoirs.

Writing in his book My Country My Life, he says in doing so Narayanan 'diverged' from the actions of his two illustrious predecessors R Venkataraman and Shankar Dayal Sharma, who had invited the leader of the single largest party or pre-election coalition to form the government without ascertaining their ability to secure the confidence of the House.

Advani cites the famous Bommai judgment of Supreme Court in 1994 as well as the Sarkaria Commission's report to say that the Governor is duty bound to invite the leader of the single largest party or pre-poll alliance to form the government. Whether or not he enjoys the confidence of the House should be decided on the floor of the Assembly and not in Raj Bhawan.  

'This being the spirit of the Constitution, the President of India could not possibly legitimise a different procedure in appointing a prime minister,' Advani says.

'Narayanan, who came to be known as an 'activist President', asked Atalji to furnish letters of support to demonstrate the NDA's ability to secure a majority. This gave time and opportunity to the Congress party to indulge, vainly, in some unholy politicking to wean away some of our potential allies,' Advani says.

No doubt, he adds, it (Congress) failed in its attempt but the 'indirect encouragement' it received from the President in 1998 whetted its deep-rooted destabilisation instincts in 1999.

Vajpayee was able to meet the President's demand and was sworn in as prime minister in March, 1998, on the condition that he would prove his majority in the Lok Sabha within ten days.

Before this government formation, Advani recalls, Congress was not deterred from trying to stitch together an alternative minus the BJP. Ultimately, the logic of elementary mathematics prevailed over the 'lust for power', he says.

'We have no numbers to form a government, so we are not staking a claim, conceded Sonia Gandhi after meeting President Narayanan. It was clear from her statement that what prevented her from staking claim was the failure to rustle up the necessary numbers, not the realisation that Congress had been denied mandate by the people.

'I am saying this here because her words hid an intent, indeed the seeds of a conspiracy to destabilise the Vajpayee government which would become manifest in a big lie spoken in the premises of Rashtrapati Bhavan in May, 1999,' writes Advani.

Advani then narrates the events during the days before the fall of the 13-month government of Vajpayee in early 1999.

Alarmed by the 'positive developments' of 'bomb, bus and budget', a reference to Pokhran nuclear tests, Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore [Images] and the Union budget, the Congress party returned to its 'old game' of destabilising non-Congress governments.

It raised a demand for dismissal of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam government in Tamil Nadu, a demand which the Vajpayee government could not accede to, Advani says.

'On April 14, 1999, the AIADMK withdrew support to the NDA government. Once again, President Narayanan played a key role in the heated political developments. He asked Prime Minister Vajpayee to seek a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha within three days,' he writes.

Advani says that despite the short time available, the NDA was able to garner the support of several smaller parties and the government was wondering whether there was a valid reason for the country to the pushed to the brink of another mid-term election.

Finally, when the motion was put to vote, the government lost by the smallest conceivable margin -- one vote -- 269 to 270.

He describes it as a 'morally and politically fraudulent, albeit technically valid vote'.

Advani says the Congress and other Opposition parties who had 'boasted' that they would form the alternative government in five minutes could not do so even after five days.

'President Narayanayan started to play an activist role again' by writing to Sonia Gandhi, inviting her to hold discussions with him.

'After the meeting she made a startling claim that she had the support of 272 lawmakers and intended to form a government,' he says.

Advani writes that while those in the NDA were taken aback by Gandhi's announcement 'many among the non-Congress parties also wondered how the Congress president could utter such a white lie in front of Rastrapati Bhavan when the arithmetic on the Opposition completely refuted her claim.'

Advani then narrates a secret meeting he had with Mulayam Singh Yadav at Jaya Jaitley's residence at the instance of NDA convenor George Fernandes [Images]. During the meeting, Mulayam promised Advani that his party will not support Congress and it wanted fresh elections.

Subsequently, Gandhi could not muster the numbers and the President granted her two more days.

'As my colleague Arun Shourie said, the President was straining to see one combination out and a particular one in,' Advani writes.

Advani quotes a Rashtrapati Bhavan statement, which said Gandhi conveyed to President that she would continue her discussion with parties and individuals who voted against the motion of confidence and 'advise the President on her efforts as early as possible.'

'For all of us in NDA, it was unbelievable to read that Sonia Gandhi told the President that she would advise him of the results of her efforts. Who is advising him?'

Gandhi met the President again and informed him of her inability to get the support of any more MPs and that her party would not support a third front government.

'What followed thereafter is even more instructive for those who wish to study sound practices by the incumbents of Rashtrapati Bhavan,' Advani says.

President Narayanan met Prime Minister Vajpayee and gave him his assessment that the 12th Lok Sabha was not capable of yielding a government with a reasonable prospect of stability and in his perception dissolution had therefore become necessary.

Advani says although NDA was not keen to approach the President to explore possibility of forming the government again 'we did find it odd that he should have thought of dissolving the Lok Sabha when it had barely completed the first year in its five year tenure by precluding the option of inviting Atalji to form a minority government.'

He then refers to the 'sound precedent' set by Venkataraman who allowed P V Narsimha Rao to form a minority government in 1991.

Advani says the Cabinet meeting held shortly thereafter put the onus for dissolution of the Lok Sabha on the President.

Advani writes that while the Cabinet recommended to the President to dissolve the House in deference to his assessment of the situation, Rashtrapati Bhavan communique later merely said the Cabinet recommended dissolution of the House so that a fresh mandate could be obtained.