The Central Intelligence Agency has clubbed India with Pakistan, Iran and North Korea as 'secondary proliferator'.

"Under economic pressure, need for lucrative foreign sales is a strong incentive to supplying entities, particularly in case of dual-use items and technology. Weak export control enforcement in some countries such as Russia and China encourages this trend. Furthermore, some traditional recipients of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and missile-related technology... are beginning to supply technology and expertise to other proliferators.

"Such 'secondary prolierators' as India, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are not members of control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime and do not adhere to their export constraints," says a CIA report.

Libya is cited as an example of proliferation by Indian and other entities. "Suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance, particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, N Korean and Chinese entities, has been critical to its ballistic missile development programme.

"Libya's capability probably remains limited to its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it will probably achieve a medium range ballistic missile capability -- a long-cherished goal -- or extended range Scud capability," it says.

Key WMD proliferators, the CIA says, are taking steps towards becoming more self-sufficient. They are better able to shield their programmes against interdiction and disruption. To this end, they are seeking greater indigenous capabilities, including more advanced production technologies.

The CIA warns that nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile-applicable technology and expertise continue to gradually disperse worldwide.

The CIA notes that as developing countries expand their chemical industries and pesticide production, they also are advancing towards at least latent chemical warfare capability.

Likewise, additional non-state actors are becoming more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage.

Proliferation of increasingly capable missile designs and technology poses the threat of more countries of concern eventually breaching the 1,000-km range of SRBMs (short range ballistic missiles) and posing greater risks to regional stability."

Most countries of proliferation concern, says the CIA, are continuing efforts to develop indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and to expand production capabilities, although most of these programmes usually rely heavily on foreign technical assistance.