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The Rediff Special/ Colonel (Dr) Anil A Athale (retd)

'The main aim of Pakistan is the destabilisation of India, not merely grabbing Kashmir'

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In May last year it was 'freedom fighters' (with artillery guns, supply bases and helicopters) who intruded in Kargil. Emboldened by the tactical success (?) Pakistan has now embarked on hijacking and hostage taking. The world (euphemism for the all powerful West), seems to accept the logic that all this is happening because of Indian obduracy over Kashmir. When Pakistan harks on a 'satisfactory solution' of Kashmir what it really means is that it should become part of Pakistan.

Unfortunately for India, the rhetoric in the West for the last half century has been to bracket Islamic Pakistan with Hindu India. The next obvious logical step is to ask the question as to why is India holding on to Kashmir that has a Muslim majority? The greatest Indian failure lies here, our failure to convince the world that India is a secular country and that the Muslim population in India at 180 million exceeds that of Pakistan. The richest Indian is also a Muslim, Mr Azim Premji of Wipro, our top film stars, artistes, scientists and till recently cricketers, are all Muslims.

Our tragedy is that Indian Muslims have failed to defend secularism and India. Thus there is no surprise that the chief of the Lashkar-E-Toiba has talked of liberating 18 crore Muslim Indians. If Pakistan is permitted to get away with this latest escalation of 'proxy hijacking', India is surely heading for a 'proxy nuclear attack' in the future. The ideal target for this could well be the Jawahar tunnel on national highway 1A on the Pir Panjal range. The world and especially the US will again counsel us patience.

The main aim of the ISI and Pakistan is the destabilisation of India and not merely grabbing Kashmir. More than anything else, this is an insult to a large number of nationalist Muslims in India who are loyal to the country of their birth. Having said that, it must also be accepted that a segment of Muslims in India fall prey to the Pakistani propaganda and help the ISI . This is not a 'post Ayodhya incident' development but predates it.

For instance, in 1972 when India held over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, those who escaped would go straight to the nearest mosque, where they found shelter and help. The separatist tendencies amongst the Indian Muslims have been nurtured by our own self serving politicians to create vote banks.

While Dr Farooq Abdullah in Kashmir has been attempting to reduce the influence of the Madarsas, our ex-defence minister Mulayam Singh Yadav went around inaugurating new ones! Half the battle against Pakistani design will be won if the Muslim Indians shed their inhibitions and come to the forefront of the fight against proxy terrorism.

But while the above can take care of the internal dimension of the Pakistani threat, by itself it will not be enough. Kashmir is a clear example. Here, after having lost popular support, the ISI is now relying on its own agents and foreign mercenaries to continue the mayhem there. There are two possible options before India.

Option one is to pay back Pakistan in its own coin. There are enough divisions in that country, between Shia and Sunni, Sindhis and Mohajirs (erstwhile refugees from India) and Pathans and Punjabis, which could be exploited. The other option is to take recourse to 'open' retaliation for acts of sabotage. Readers may remember how in the 1980s the US launched air attacks on Libya when one American was wounded in a Libyan inspired terrorist attack on board an Italian luxury liner, the Achille Lauro. The UN charter permits the right of hot pursuit as well as retaliation. Israel has been doing this to Lebanon for several years.

The reasons for Pakistani hostility are rooted in the very ideology of that nation. The two nation theory that brought Pakistan into existence cannot accept a secular India. There is no substitute to retaliation in this case. This policy of retaliation should be well advertised and Pakistan given a chance to mend its ways. India enjoys an edge over Pakistan in conventional weaponry. This force should be used in a graduated manner against the Pakistani border areas as a first step. Artillery shelling of the terrorist training camps can raise the cost of its interference for Pakistan.

The Pakistani capital of Islamabad is barely 65 kilometers from the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Use of long range guns from there can reach the suburbs of Rawalpindi. In the area of Jhangar, the Mangla dam on the Jhelum which is the source of half the electricity generation in Pakistan, is barely 12 kilometres away from Jhangar. Artillery attacks, in retaliation to support for terrorism in India, can cripple the Pakistani economy. All these measures can be taken without any declaration of war as Kashmir is recognised as a disputed area and the demarcating line there does not have the status of an international border. It is noteworthy that in the Middle East, Egypt and Israel fought artillery duels for over six years between 1967 to 1973 and it has been a regular feature of the Golan Heights on the Israel-Syrian border for a much longer period. By adopting this tactic, India will be able to seize initiative from Pakistan.

Indian diplomacy failed to penalise Pakistan on the breach of the Simla and Lahore agreements. Once Pakistan was convinced that it can get away with it without suffering any loss, it continued to test Indian tolerance. In this Pakistan has been entirely consistent in her approach to India. Attempt at 'parity' and hostility to India has been fairly constant over all these years. As it became increasingly clear that strategic parity with India was difficult to achieve, Pakistan was single-mindedly working for the break up of India.

It appears from the various statements by General Pervez Musharraf that he is aware of the likely Indian action and is threatening a nuclear response. It is here that the greatest test of Indian diplomacy will come. India must insist on the world community that the threat of nuclear war is not a result of Indian policy in Kashmir but a Pakistani sponsored proxy war. End that and the threat will go away.

Rethink on deterrence

Deterrence, which is central to the Cold War strategic debate and the cornerstone of the Indian nuclear doctrine, is not a concept but a convenient term coined to rationalise the situation of stalemate that was characterised by technical parameters like:

* Huge stockpiles capable of destroying the world five times over

* No 100 per cent defence against an attack by nuclear tipped ballistic missiles

* Global fallout and nuclear winter that recognised no national boundaries.

But behind the façade of reliance on a second strike and apparent stability, each side was ever-ready for a 'launch on warning'. Nuclear weapons have changed the relationship between force and politics, as avoidance of a nuclear war becomes the overriding aim of State policy. Surprise is to be avoided at all cost, instead information, dialogue, credibility and declaratory responses to escalation, assume primacy.

Deterrence was an issue and country specific, a two person non-zero sum game. Deterrence as defined is a product of credibility and capability. Capability (not mere potential) can be divided into capability to make or put to use, nuclear power. Nuclear weapons form one part of the whole security policy and cannot be logically dealt in isolation.

India cannot rely on the assurances of China and the good sense in Pakistan to protect its territory from a surprise nuclear attack. Towards the defence of its territory India must build anti aircraft/missile defences based on beam weapons and acquire a non explosive nuclear counter force capability. Enhanced radiation weapons may form part of this capability and would be termed as defensive and non explosive nuclear weapons. The Indian pledge of NO FIRST USE needs to modified to NO FIRST USE, BUT NO SECOND USE EITHER!

The West and the Communist bloc remained in state of readiness for nearly 25 years and managed to avoid war. India has no choice but to follow that unless she wants to opt for a unilateral bleeding in proxy war by an incorrigible enemy.

The Rediff Specials

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