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'Kumaratunga realises her army cannot win the war for peace'

The usually precise Tamil Tigers failed to bump off President Chandrika Kumaratunga who was in a neck and neck electoral race with her rival. For the LTTE it was the supreme irony of a suicidal decade which began with the assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. The abortive assassination attempt ensured Kumaratunga's victory, the very outcome the Tigers had sought to prevent.

The young Tigresses who formed the core of the human bomber teams have an enviable score card: no misses. They have eliminated Tamil leaders, a president, two defence ministers, a presidential candidate and other ministers and several top army, navy and police commanders. All the Sinhalese victims were from the UNP which is known to have given succour to the LTTE. The AK 47 armed women warriors are called Freedom Birds. They wear rubber chappals and jeans. Dhanu was one of them. She took out Rajiv Gandhi. This extraordinarily motivated breed of killers worship their supreme leader, Prabhakaran, and the cult of martyrdom.

Following the monumental military reversals last month and the failure of the four year long war for peace strategy to end the ethnic conflict, Kumaratunga's defeat was on the cards. In 1994, she won a landslide victory because her rival was assassinated. Elections in Sri Lanka are the most vicious and violent anywhere. More than 50 persons were killed during this presidential election.

The last two months must be the most demoralising for the Sinhala nation, as Prabhakaran calls Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan army -- SLA -- was shamefully routed by the Tigers last month, undoing in six days, the gains made by the army in 18 months for a loss of nearly 4,500 soldiers. Last year, the defence budget had touched an unprecedented nine per cent of the GDP mark. The LTTE brought the war into the heart of Colombo, missing by a whisker, the country's most highly protected person, the president. Sri Lankans are asking if Kumaratunga is not secure, how can Kesavaratne or Gunasekara be?

A cruel joke doing the rounds in Colombo is the best way of protecting the president is by eliminating the office of the president, something Kumaratunga had promised to do. Her presidency was marked by an overemphasis on the military solution, for many the only route for ending the ethnic conflict.

The quest for military one-upmanship for gaining a position of strength at the negotiating table has obsessed both sides. In addition, there is an ego and prestige problem. Admittedly, the SLA had made spectacular gains like liberating Jaffna and parts of Wanni. It had boxed in the LTTE around the coastal town of Mullaittivu after forcing them out of their citadel of Eelam.

As more territory came under government control, the SLA was getting overstretched. Enlarging military control requires augmentation of resources. This did not happen and soldiers suffered from intense battle fatigue. With 11 of 12 army divisions holding ground, no turnover or training of troops was possible, while desertions, low morale and political interference continued.

The Tigers, on the other hand, were regrouping to avenge the loss of Jaffna with their war replenishments coming from the SLA. The coup de grace was delivered soon after the SLA had completed celebrating its 50 years. The sudden and total collapse of military garrisons, one after another, without even token resistance led to an ignominious retreat and collapse of command.

It is now the turn of the Tigers to spread themselves thin, laying siege to several army camps. Elephant Pass is the most dangerous and vital for any reunification of the mainland with the Jaffna peninsula. The other is the beleaguered Weli Oya camp, the controversial Sinhalese settlement on the border between the north and eastern provinces. These two are high on the LTTE's list of redemption.

Their objective is to restore the military positions held by the two sides prior to the government's military offensive. Only the recovery of the Jaffna peninsula would redeem in full, the Tigers's military honour. Once that happens, the ground position will return to the one during the UNP rule: Jaffna and Wanni in the Tigers's jurisdiction with the eastern province under loose government control.

Kumaratunga has two options: wipe out terrorism -- continue along the military path -- as she broadcast from the hospital bed; or once more try talking to the Tigers. On his part, Prabhakaran says there "are no alternatives to separate Eelam". But his mind is open to a "peaceful negotiated settlement with international mediation".

She realises her army has run out of steam and cannot win the war for peace. Soon after the military reverses, her foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, said that peace was not possible without the LTTE: that the government was prepared to resume negotiations after elections as soon as practicable, but under a third party facilitator and not, he emphasised, a mediator.

In the past, each side had attached conditionalities to talks. The government wanted a token surrender of weapons, a statement abjuring violence and time-specific negotiations. The Tigers had insisted on withdrawal from occupied areas, lifting of the economic blockade and third party mediation.

While both sides have been continuously waging war, there has been no political engagement on the devolution package and constitutional reforms. The first draft devolution package and the new constitution were ready by August 3, 1995. The former is stuck over the unit of devolution and the powers to be devolved. The majority Sinhalese object to replacing the unitary state with the proposed union of regions. The UNP has proposed an asymmetric devolution only for the Tamil homeland.

Different models of the Tamil homeland have been grafted: separate north and east Tamil provinces with a Muslim province crafted out of the east. Still in existence is the unified northeast province created through the 13th amendment following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The Tamils will insist on continuity and cohesion.

Much work has been done on the new constitution which has already seen three texts between 1995 and 1997. If accepted, it will be Sri Lanka's fourth constitution since independence. Historically there is greater readiness on the part of Sri Lankans to persist with a military solution than on resuming the political process. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on the devolution package and the constitution or even on the abolition of the executive presidency.

There are constitutional hurdles in the way of implementing the devolution package due to lack of a two thirds majority vote in Parliament. Between the government and the LTTE, there are more serious difficulties; lack of trust, absence of sincerity and no political will. Further, confidence building measures have never been tried.

The most distressing feature of this war in India's backyard is its hands-off-Sri Lanka policy. The once bitten twice shy India cannot stand idly by. Will India do nothing were the Tigers to come close to achieving Eelam? That would send a dangerous signal to secessionists in India.

Relations between the two countries have grown in the economic and cultural fields, thanks to bilateral free trade arrangements and the Indo Sri Lanka Foundation. Short of troops assistance, India must help Sri Lanka militarily to face the challenges posed by the LTTE through a comprehensive military training and assistance package. Recently a Rs 104 crore military equipment order was gifted to Sri Lanka.

The only way to end the madness -- the orgy of terror and violence -- in Sri Lanka is through give and take by both sides. India must have a role in this.

General Ashok K Mehta