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The General in his Labyrinth

I am sure that Delhi's professional Pakistan-watchers have run war games using the scenario being played out in Islamabad; I hope they do have a plan. While Indians might be tempted to gleefully contrast their own robust democracy with the Latin-American-style coup du jour in Pakistan, that misses the point altogether. For an overtly military-run Pakistan is a dangerous entity in possession of the famed Red Button.

There are several problems India will face with the Pakistani Army:

1. Their Army has been thoroughly fundamentalized starting with Zia-ul-Haq and his then-benefactors, the Americans. The old guard, Sandhurst types, have been marginalized; today's officers are Jihadists.

2. Life is getting to be a little difficult for their allies such as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, et al. At the very least, there has to be a nominal separation from them: can't keep sending army regulars there and calling them freedom-fighters or whatever. Thus the temptation to step up the Jihad in soft-state India is very high.

3. The Kargil skirmish has convinced them that they have the tactical skills to mount large-scale, winnable attacks on Indian territory, especially in Jammu & Kashmir. In their view, it was only the politicians who were cowed down by international condemnation.

4. The memories of humiliation in 1971 still run high; their idea that each Pakistani soldier is worth ten of the despised 'vegetarian Hindu' Indian soldiers is axiomatic. They wish to take revenge on India by returning the favour using Kashmir as the lever to dismember India.

5. As much as J&K is important to India's secular fabric, it is equally important to the Pakistani Army's fervent belief in the Two-Nation Theory. They would not mind it at all if capturing J&K lets loose a massive backlash against Indian Muslims. They in fact expect it, and would say, "See, I told you so."

6. It is quite possible that they consider a limited nuclear war an acceptable scenario if that causes significant damage to India, despite what it might do to Pakistan itself.

Given all this, India would be well-advised to take the Pakistani coup very seriously indeed. The last item is the one that makes me worry the most: for it is pretty clear that Pakistan acquired their semi-knocked-down-kit bombs from China as early as 1987. They then spent a number of years acquiring indigenous capacity for both the bombs and for delivery systems. It is possible that their politicians prevailed upon the army to not test the weapons, fearing US censure.

In this scenario, one of the things that might have happened in 1998 is the possibility that Pakistan may have exploded its weapons in Chagai regardless of whether Pokhran II took place at all. If that happened, it would have put the Indians in a very difficult position: Pakistan tests, and the whole world would pile on India with dire threats of sanctions; whereupon, cowed, India would mouth platitudes about proliferation and refrain from (or be unable to conduct due to unpreparedness) any tests. This is possibly what the Pakistani Army wanted.

From what little I see of the Pakistani press, with the single notable exception of Flight Lieutenant (Retd). Burney Khalili in The Nation (August 13, 1999) -- and this is no doubt the reason he retired with that relatively low rank, as my hawkish friend Bapa Rao pointed out -- not one person in the Pakistani establishment has questioned the legal and moral position of what Pakistan is attempting in J&K.

In other words, there seems to be a national consensus amongst the Pakistani establishment that jihad in the pursuit of J&K is justified. Notably, nobody has chosen to ask the Kashmiris themselves, either in the Northern Territories or in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (also known as 'Azad' Kashmir). It is worth recalling that in the Kargil affair, soldiers from these territories were used as cannon fodder, while their Punjabi officers led safely from the rear.

I think there is no middle ground on Kashmir -- public opinion is polarized to too great an extent in both countries. India wants all of J&K; so does Pakistan. In fact, in Pakistan's case, even the sensible suggestion of converting the Line of Control into an international border would be considered an unacceptable concession.

So where does all this leave us? I think India has to accept that Pakistan will never give up its ambition to annex all of J&K, bus diplomacy or no bus diplomacy. We can expect continuing Low-Intensity Conflict there, with periodic massacres of Hindus, unless and until said Hindus fight back. This should be taken as a given. India should pay lip service to discussing J&K, but with a very clear understanding internally that it will not make any concessions whatsoever, and that it will wear down the invaders sooner or later. Obduracy as tactic.

All real dialogue with Pakistan should be based on possibly less contentious areas. For instance, trade in the SAARC, common complaints against the WTO/IPR regime, the CTBT/FMCT and other mutually important issues where there is potential for some breakthroughs. I think this is possibly India's fifth column -- businessmen in Pakistan who can see the benefits of co-operation with an India whose products are well-known and often desired there.

There is no point in immediately denouncing the army -- interestingly some of the military establishment are themselves among the big landlords, businessmen and bankers (the 21 families that dominate the Pakistani economy). India should speak conciliatorily: as the old cliché goes, "you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar".

Teddy Roosevelt's dictum about the US presence in the hemisphere is also a good model: "speak softly but carry a big stick". India should continue apace with its national security plans, not lowering its guard for a moment. But there is no reason to condemn General Musharraf and his cohorts -- India should gently deplore the passing of democracy in Pakistan, and then continue with business as usual.

Rajeev Srinivasan