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August 13, 1999

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Congress in a quandary

The Congress has traditionally depended on slogans and symbols to win polls. 'Garibi hatao!' 'A government that works!' What will be the centrepiece of the Congress campaign in 1999?

One year ago it was economic mismanagement, symbolised in the onion. Today, inflation is at its lowest point in twenty years and the stock market is climbing heights not seen even during the 1991-92 scam. There hasn't been any major communal disturbance. That leaves Kargil.

The Congress tactic of running down the Vajpayee ministry on this account has already begun. But will it still be a major talking point when polling begins? Possibly, thanks to a certain influential section in Pakistan which still feels humiliated by the outcome of the Kargil invasion. They reckon Pakistan's diplomatic isolation was because nobody believed the story about irregulars doing all the fighting. This problem can be solved by proving only Kashmiris are involved.

Thus high profile incidents such as the suicidal assaults on Indian army camps. It is wasteful of human lives, but remember that the generals in Islamabad are insulated from public opinion since Pakistan isn't a democracy. This will, hopefully, keep the Kashmir issue in the headlines all over the world. And it will also embarrass the Vajpayee ministry. This is a blunder on two counts.

First, being attacked by Pakistani hawks is a vote-winner. (Rather like one Pakistani newspaper proudly announcing on its website that it was banned in India; even if that ban has been lifted, it is still enough to give its popularity a boost.) But how about the effect of such a campaign on global opinion?

Here again, Pakistan has miscalculated. Its diplomats walked into a trap of their own making with the initial statement that regular Pakistani soldiers weren't involved in Kargil. It led to the suspicion that Islamabad wasn't in control of its own territory, becoming a haven for militants. It didn't help that these groups were popularly identified with Osama bin Laden.

The United States and China couldn't regard such a development with anything but the utmost suspicion. I have touched on the reactions of these nations before and shall not repeat myself.

I had also written that the Indian government had offered hard proof of foreign involvement; the hard figures are now available: 1,371 foreign mercenaries were killed in Jammu and Kashmir since 1991. Afghanistan accounted for 279 militants, with other countries such as Sudan, Yemen, and Algeria making up the numbers. (686 of these 1,371 men could not be identified at all.) Hundred and forty foreign mercenaries were captured alive, coming from countries as diverse as Britain and Bangladesh.

Intelligence sources estimate there are roughly 3,700 militants still active in the state. Over half -- 1,900 -- have been identified as foreigners. Of the various groups, the Lashkar-e-Toiba is supposed to have the highest foreign component -- over 90 per cent.

That by itself might not worry other countries, but alarm bells begin to ring when there is evidence of a Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus. Because it turns out that the militants are being trained in Pashdad and Turkham, both on Afghan soil. And if India is the target today, could it not be, say, the United States tomorrow? All this is happening when the United States has announced a ten billion dollar budget to hunt militants.

This leaves Pakistani decision-makers in a bit of a bind. Do they admit their soldiers were involved in the Kargil invasion, or do they stick by the story that several thousand militants operate with impunity from Pakistani territory? If the former, how do they explain this invasion of another nation? If the latter, how did the militants obtain everything from snow-boots to Stinger missiles?

The confusion in Islamabad is well matched by that in Congress headquarters in Delhi. How does the party react to the post-Kargil, low-level militancy in Jammu and Kashmir? It cannot afford to be seen backing the government, but nor can it be seen as doing or saying anything that shall remotely help the militants. And nor, of course, can it afford to remain totally silent when the general election is just four weeks away.

Sonia Gandhi has fallen back on the tactic of saying the Congress backs the government in any anti-militancy activity, yet simultaneously saying the government is ineffective. What is the point in backing an ineffective administration? I have written before that Sonia Gandhi is in danger of getting her priorities wrong by ignoring the Deccan. She doesn't seem any more clear-minded about Kargil.

T V R Shenoy

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